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Public Reporting by Benefit Corporations: 
Importance, Compliance, and 
Recommendations* 
 
Maxime Verheyden†
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Social entrepreneurship is becoming increasingly popular.1  Social 
enterprises commit to a social and or environmental purpose as a second 
master besides shareholders.2  There is a growing demand of consumers, 
investors and employees for such enterprises.3  The legal world reacted with 
frenetic legislative activity, resulting in new legal entities to accommodate 
these social enterprises. 
 
 * An earlier draft of this article won the Victor Brudney Prize, established by the Program on 
Corporate Governance at Harvard Law School and awarded to the best student paper on a topic related 
to corporate governance. 
 †  LL.M., 2017, Harvard University.  I would like to thank Professor Reinier Kraakman for his 
guidance and support 
 1. See J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications and Benefit 
Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV 1, 26 n.115 (2012) (mentioning the plethora of media articles, 
and business and law school programs and other clinics related to this topic). 
 2. The terms “social enterprise,” and “social entrepreneurship” will, for the purposes of this paper, 
mean enterprises with such a double purpose of (i) pursuing profit generation (ii) pursuing a social and 
or environmental purpose.  Legal scholars have used similar definitions, see, e.g., Murray, Master, supra 
note 1, at 4 n.4; Anthony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social 
Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1353 (2011); Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate 
Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 269 (2013). 
 3. See infra notes 35–38 and accompanying text. 
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One of these new entities,4 the benefit corporation, exists in thirty-three 
states and the District of Columbia,5 and legislation is also under review in a 
handful of other states.6  Although the different state statutes are far from 
identical, there are some common characteristics.  All states provide for (i) a 
broader corporate purpose,7 (ii) an expanded fiduciary duty encompassing 
non-shareholder interests,8 and (iii) a framework for reporting about social 
and environmental achievements.9  
It is precisely this broader corporate purpose and expanded fiduciary 
duty in for profit companies that fundamentally innovate American corporate 
law.10  The purpose of the benefit corporation statutes is ambitious:  
Accommodating social entrepreneurship in a special legal entity and giving 
social entrepreneurs the opportunity to use this legal entity as a way to signal 
to consumers, investors, and employees that they are genuinely doing 
business in a responsible manner.11  This ambitious purpose and the effect of 
a state-sanctioned corporate responsibility label makes accountability 
pivotal.  The state legislators have opted for a “transparency-based 
accountability” model12 thereby making the periodic reporting requirement 
of crucial importance. 
 
 4. This includes the low-profit limited liability company, available in eight states, the flexible 
purpose corporation in California and the social purpose corporation in Washington and Florida.  See 
generally Status Tool, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW TRACKER (for a state-by-state overview of the available 
alternatives for benefit corporations), http://socentlawtracker.org/#/bcorps [https://perma.cc/N6H8-
R4TX]; Murray, Master, supra note 1, at 22–24 (describing these corporate entities and the differences 
with benefit corporations in more detail). 
 5. See infra Appendix I for a table of all states that have enacted benefit corporation legislation. 
A number of states have seen benefit corporation legislation fail:  See Status Tool, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 
LAW TRACKER, http://socentlawtracker.org/#/bcorps (last visited Apr. 19, 2017). 
 6. See Status Tool, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW TRACKER, http://socentlawtracker.org/#/bcorps (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2017). 
 7. See infra note 66 for a description of the way this broader purpose is defined in the different 
states. 
 8. Note that there is no fiduciary duty towards these non-shareholders; see infra note 95 and 
accompanying text. 
 9. William H. Clark Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations are Redefining the 
Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 838–839 (2013); Jessica Chu, Filling 
a Nonexistent Gap: Benefit Corporations and the Myth of Shareholder Wealth Maximization, 22 S. CALIF. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 155, 161–162 (2012); Kennan El Khatib, The Harms of the Benefit Corporation, 65 AM. 
U. L. REV. 151, 153 (2015); Vanisha Sukdeo, What is the Benefit of a ‘Benefit Corporation’? Examining 
the Advantages and Detriment, 31 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 89, 91 (2011). 
 10. See infra notes 89–108 and accompanying text for a description of the liability regime for 
violations of these expanded fiduciary duties. 
 11. See infra notes 35–62 and accompanying text. 
 12. The credits for coining this term in this context go to Briana Cummings, Benefit Corporations: 
How to Enforce a Mandate to Promote the Public Good, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 578, 595 (2012). 
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However, in his early report on reporting compliance, Dr. Haskell 
Murray found a problematically low reporting rate, between eight and ten 
percent.13  In this paper, I expand the data on benefit reporting, by analyzing 
reporting rates in Oregon, Colorado, Minnesota and Delaware.  By crossing 
these results with other variables,14 I test some of the potential reasons 
suggested as causes of the low reporting rate,15 and I test other reasons which 
have not yet been suggested in the literature.16  This results in a thorough 
understanding of the parameters influencing the benefit corporations’ 
reporting.  Based on these parameters, I provide recommendations to state 
legislators.17  These recommendations do not only target states with benefit 
corporation statutes, whose public reporting provisions are summarized in 
Appendix I.  The recommendations also target states where benefit 
corporation legislation is under review.18  The data I have accumulated and 
the recommendations I make should enable these legislators to make more 
informed decisions about public reporting.  
For instance, two of the three benefit corporation statutes that entered 
into force in 2017 lack an obligation to publish the benefit report and all three 
statutes lack enforcement mechanisms backing the reporting duties of the 
benefit corporations.19  In light of the importance given to accountability by 
proponents of the benefit corporation statutes and the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of states still mandate publication,20 this paper first 
thoroughly analyzes the importance of public reporting from a theoretical 
point of view. 
Empirically, this paper also aims to add to the limited available data 
about benefit corporations.  Since the adoption of the first statute in 2010,21 
 
 13. J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA L. REV. 25, 34–35 (2015) 
(suggesting different reasons for the low reporting, without testing them statistically). 
 14. Third-party certification, headquarters, size, principal place of business and corporate age. 
 15. See e.g., Murray, Benefit Reports, supra note 13. 
 16. For instance, I cross the results in terms of third-party certification with the reporting rates.  
 17. Note that Italy has also adopted a benefit corporation statute that is very similar to the MBCL 
and mandates an annual report that has to be placed on the website, if a “Societa benefit” has one, see L. 
28 dicembre 2015, n. 208, G.U. Dec. 30, 2015, n. 302 (It.), art. 376–84. Similar legislation has also been 
adopted in Puerto Rico, creating the “Corporacion de Beneficio Social” and the “Compania de 
Responsabilidad Limitada con Fin Social.”  See P.R. LAWS AN. tit. 14, § 4071–4084 (2016) for the 
corporation (requiring annual filing of a benefit report with a state agency).  B Lab states that legislation 
is on its way in Australia, Argentina, Chile, Canada and Colombia as well.  International Legislation, B 
LAB, http://benefitcorp.net/international-legislation [https://perma.cc/QM6R-TVHW].  In that sense, this 
paper’s findings may also be interesting for foreign legislators considering enacting similar legislation. 
 18. See supra, note 6 and accompanying text. 
 19. See infra Appendix I. 
 20. See infra note 69 and Appendix I. 
 21. The first state to adopt a benefit corporation statute was Maryland; see MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. 
& ASS’NS §§ 5-6C-01 to 5-6C-08 (LexisNexis 2016).  
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there is still a scarcity of information about the firms that incorporate as, or 
convert to, benefit corporations,22 why they do so,23 and whether they comply 
with the legal requirements.24  Moreover, a comparison of voluntary 
reporting in Delaware and of compliance in the mandatory systems in 
Oregon, Colorado, and Minnesota will add to the literature about the 
usefulness of mandatory legal rules and mandatory disclosure. 
One of the reasons for the lack of information about benefit corporations 
— besides their recent inception — is the fact that they are almost 
exclusively private companies.25  This implies a natural limitation with 
regard to the depth and the uniformity of the gathered information.  
Before describing the structure of this paper, it is important to make a 
terminological clarification.  While B Lab26 used the name “benefit 
corporation” in the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation (MBCL) it 
drafted and promoted, state legislators have used different names.  For 
instance, Delaware uses “public benefit corporation,” whereas Oregon uses 
“benefit company.”27  In this paper, I will use the term “benefit corporations” 
when referring to all the entities that have the three characteristics mentioned 
 
 22. A study which partially analyzes this is Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit 
Corporation 90 Days Out: Who’s Opting In?. 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247–280 (2014).  My study is 
useful to complement this study, which (i) only analyzed Delaware public benefit corporations (ii) only 
analyzed corporations that became public benefit corporations within 30 days after the statute’s entry into 
force (i.e., early adopters) (iii) did not analyze third-party certification, size and principal place of 
business. 
 23.  See generally Megan Burkhart et al., Conference Report, The State of Social Enterprise: 
Maryland, (an early survey limited to Maryland about these motives) https://www.slideshare. 
net/changematters/maryland-benefit-corporations-analysis-full-report [https://perma.cc/U592-FHEU]; 
Michael B. Dorff, Why Public Benefit Corporations, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2017) (analyzing 
the motives of a sample of 25 benefit corporations), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2848617.  
 24. See Murray, Benefit Reports, supra note 13 (analyzing benefit reporting in Virginia, Hawaii, 
California and New York). 
 25. The only exception is Laureate Education, a Delaware public benefit corporation listed on 
Nasdaq since February 1, 2017.  Etsy Inc., a company listed on Nasdaq was a benefit corporation until 
2017.  It decided not to apply for recertification when it faced the obligation to convert to a public benefit 
corporation.  See David Gelles, Inside the Revolution at Etsy, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/25/ 
business/etsy-josh-silverman.html [https://perma.cc/6WMJ-89PH].  About the dilemma which faced Etsy 
Inc.  Alicia Plerhoples, Social Enterprise As Commitment:  A Roadmap, 48 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 89, 
109 n.96 (2015). 
 26. B Lab is a nonprofit that, for the purposes of this paper has played an important role in the 
benefit corporation movement by fulfilling three roles: (i) It is the market leader in corporate social 
responsibility certification amongst benefit corporations, (ii) has actively promoted the adoption of 
benefit corporation statutes (see infra note 31) and (iii) it has developed the most used third-party standard 
used by benefit corporations in their periodic reports (B Impact Assessment) (see infra note 305 and 
accompanying text).  See also About B Lab¸ B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/ 
about-b-lab [https://perma.cc/6WRU-DBYM]. 
 27. See Appendix I for an overview of the benefit corporation names. 
2_VERHEYDEN_FINAL (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2018  12:18 PM 
2018 PUBLIC REPORTING BY BENEFIT CORPORATIONS 41 
 
above.28  Benefit corporations have to be distinguished from B 
Corporations,29 which are companies that have been certified by B Lab.30 
A final preliminary comment concerns the rationale and motives for 
benefit corporation legislation.  While I do devote a substantial part of my 
article to an analysis of the motives that drove state legislators to adopt the 
statutes, this analysis does not necessarily imply an endorsement of these 
motives.  Rather, I intend to take the existence of benefit corporations in the 
majority of states as a given and show how crucially important public 
reporting is, given the legislators’ intentions. 
In Part I, I analyze why public reporting is crucial for benefit 
corporations.  After a discussion of the motives leading to the adoption of 
benefit corporation statutes, I argue that accountability is crucial to reach the 
statutes’ goals.  I then explain why public reporting is necessary for 
accountability and why it could also be considered as a separate goal.  
Finally, I analyze why I believe that the benefits of imposing public reporting 
outweigh the costs, and I briefly discuss enforcement of such a public-
reporting requirement.  In Part II, I analyze benefit reporting data in Oregon, 
Colorado, Minnesota and Delaware and analyze some potential explanations 
for the low reporting levels. In Part III, based on these results, I make some 
recommendations to enhance the reporting system in a way that strikes a 
balance between the need for transparency and the practical reality as shown 
by the data. 
 
I.  THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC REPORTING 
 
A. THE TRANSPARENCY-BASED ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEM. 
 
1. Analysis of the Motives: Accountability is Crucial. 
 
In this section, I first reconstrue the common motives leading to the 
 
 28. I will use the different and specific terms, such as benefit company and public benefit 
corporation when discussing specific states’ legal entities.  A list of benefit corporation and company 
legislation is included in Appendix I. 
 29. This is a very important distinction, which is not always strictly respected in practice.  For 
instance, benefit corporations often appear to be confused about the name of the legal structure they have 
adopted.  
 30. To become a certified B Corporation for two years, companies have to meet minimum 
performance requirement of 80 points (out of 200) on the B Impact Assessment test, meet legal 
requirements (which in some states, includes conversion to the benefit corporation status), take part in a 
yearly auditing of ten percent of the B Corporations, and finally pay a fee that ranges from $500 to 
$50,000 depending on annual sales levels.  See Make it Official, B LAB, https://www.bcorporatio 
n.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/make-it-official-2 [https://perma.cc/6GYG-U8WK]. 
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adoption of benefit corporation statutes.  I analyze the legislative documents 
in all of the states discussed in Part II, as well as documents issued by B 
Lab,31 the drafter of MBCL,32 and other different relevant actors.33  The 
motives expressed by these sources combine three factors: A growing 
demand for socially and environmentally responsible enterprises, legal 
obstacles hindering social enterprises, and the goal of countering 
greenwashing.34  Thereafter, I discuss the raison d’être of benefit corporation 
statutes and why public reporting is crucial for these statutes to reach their 
goals. 
 
a. Growing Demand for Socially and Environmentally 
Responsible Enterprises by Investors, Employees, Consumers, 
and Entrepreneurs. 
 
The first factor leading to the adoption of benefit corporation legislation 
is the increased demand for socially and environmentally responsible 
businesses by different groups: investors, consumers, and employees.35  
Proponents systematically refer to the growing market for socially 
responsible investing.36  Furthermore, they invoke the impact of the social 
 
 31. B Lab has sponsored some of the benefit corporation bills.  See Be the Change Oregon Steering 
Committee, Oregon Benefit Company Backgrounder, B LAB, 7 (Feb. 22, 2013) (listing B Lab as initial 
sponsor for bill), https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2013R1/Downloads/CommitteeMeetingDocument/10835 
[https://perma.cc/7UEJ-UKYV]; Benefit Corporations: Hearing on AB 361 Before the Assemb. Judiciary 
Comm., 2011–12 Leg. Sess. 5 (Cal. 2011) (disclosing B Lab sponsorship of California bill). 
 32. William Clark drafted the MBCL, Benefit Corporation, The Model Legislation, B LAB (Apr. 9, 
2017), http://benefitcorp.net/attorneys/model-legislation [https://perma.cc/2NAB-CNWE].  He also acted 
as one of the initial draftsmen of the Oregon benefit company statute.  His fellow draftsmen were Oregon 
corporate lawyers gathered in an Oregon Corporate Lawyers’ Committee.  See Be the Change Oregon 
Steering Committee, supra note 31, at 6. 
 33. These actors include the governor of Delaware at the time of the adoption of the statute and 
members of the different committees involved in the drafting and the preparation of the legislation. 
 34. Nonetheless, an underlying motive of some proponents of benefit corporation legislation is even 
more ambitious: Starting a movement to influence all corporations to act not only in the interests of 
shareholders, but also of other stakeholders.  B Lab may well focus on social enterprises on most of its 
webpages, but on its page for donations, one can read: “With your contribution, you help us create a world 
in which one day all companies will compete not just to be the best in the world, but to be the best FOR 
the world.”  Help build a global movement to redefine success in business, B LAB https://donatenow. 
networkforgood.org/BtheChange [https://perma.cc/JPA2-F46L].  See also Leo E. Strine Jr., Making it 
Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV, 235, 253 (2014). 
 35. Proponents also mention entrepreneurs, but they are discussed in the next paragraph because I 
consider them representative of the supply side of the market for social enterprises. 
 36. See Be the Change Oregon Steering Committee, supra note 31; see also D. J. Vogt, Legislative 
Director, The Oregon Business Association (OBA) Supports House Bill 2296, OR. BUS. ASS’N (Mar. 18, 
2013) (testimony before the Or. H. Comm. on Bus. & Lab.); and Justin Delaney, Vice President and 
Associate Counsel, Statement of Support for HB 2296-3, STANDARD INS. CO. (Mar. 18, 2013) (testimony 
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and environmental responsibility of businesses on consumers’ choices.37  A 
very similar argument is made about employees.  Employees, proponents 
argue, are more willing to work for socially and environmentally responsible 
companies.38 
The increasing demand for socially and environmentally responsible 
enterprises does not necessarily call for legal intervention.  If the supply side 
adapts to the growing demand, the market equilibrium will change and the 
quantity of social enterprises will rise.  In this scenario, the supply side 
consists of entrepreneurs willing to create social impact in a profitable way.  
The proponents argue that a large number of entrepreneurs want to create 
such social enterprises.39 
Creating a nonprofit is not the most suitable option for many of these 
entrepreneurs.  First, the nondistribution constraint40 implies the 
impossibility of raising equity capital and difficulties securing debt 
financing,41 and might deter talented entrepreneurs from starting a social 
 
before the Or. H. Comm. on Bus. & Lab.); Clark & Babson, supra note 9, at 822 (citing different reports 
to prove the potential of the socially responsible investing market); Deborah J. Walker, Please Welcome 
the Minnesota Public Benefit Corporation, 11 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 151, 179–180 (2013) (member of the 
drafting committee of the Minnesota Act referring to socially responsible investing).  See also Hearing 
on AB 361, supra note 31, at 4 (stating that the bill will enable benefit corporations to “attract capital 
from the growing community of investors seeking both financial return and social impact”); Press 
Release, State of Del., Governor Markell Signs Public Benefit Corporation Legislation (July 17, 2013) 
(stating that the public benefit corporations statute will help accelerating the socially responsible 
“investment opportunity”), http://news.delaware.gov/2013/07/17/governor-markell-signs-public-benefit-
corporation-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/TW6M-92UN]. 
 37. Clark & Babson, supra note 9, 819–20 and the studies they refer to; see Press Release, State of 
Del., supra note 36 (stating that public benefit corporations will help businesses “attract customers”).  
Although the proponents focus on consumers, this category could be expanded to all potential contracting 
parties since, for instance, suppliers may also be especially keen on doing business with benefit 
corporations.  Some B Corporations are already awarded discounts by other B Corporations.  See Save 
Money and Access Services, B LAB (listing a number of B Corporations offering discounts to other B 
Corporations), https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/why-become-a-b-corp/save-money-and-
access-services [https://perma.cc/W3YA-WDFX]. 
 38. See Press Release, State of Del., supra note 36 (stating that public benefit corporations will help 
businesses “attract talent”).  See also Alicia E. Plerhoples, Nonprofit Displacement and the Pursuit of 
Charity Through Public Benefit Corporations, at 39 (Geo. Univ. Law Ctr., Scholarship @ Geo. Law, 
2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2817881 (mentioning the potential psychic rewards for employees of 
public benefit corporations and comparing them to nonprofit employees). 
 39. See Clark & Babson, supra note 9, at 823–24. 
 40. See infra note 63–65 and accompanying text. 
 41. See Anurag Gupta, L3C’s and B Corps: New Corporate Forms Fertilizing the Field Between 
Traditional For-Profit and Nonprofit Corporations, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 203, 214 (2011); Steven 
Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance Mechanisms Can Enhance the 
Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW. J.L. & SOCIAL POLICY 170, 174 (2012) (explaining a double 
consequence of this inability: the time and money invested in finding donors and the difficulties securing 
loans because of the “inconsistent access to capital for repayment”); Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of 
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enterprise with the double purpose of public-benefit creation and profit 
generation.  Further, it is a typical feature of social enterprises to have 
income-generating activities at the core of their business and to directly or 
indirectly harness these activities to achieve public benefit.42  For nonprofits, 
however, tax regulations significantly limit the allowed commercial 
activities.43  Other inconveniences facing nonprofits include limitations in 
terms of lobbying and political campaigning.44  As a result, many social 
entrepreneurs are bound to use for-profit entities as vehicles for their 
businesses.  
Accordingly, the growing demand by investors, consumers, and 
employees should result in a strong spike in creation of for-profit social 
enterprises.  This is when the proponents’ second claim — the legal obstacles 
hindering the supply of social enterprises — becomes relevant. 
 
b. Legal Uncertainty for Corporations With a Broader Purpose. 
 
Proponents argue that directors who consider other interests than those 
of the shareholders when running a business face a significant risk of liability 
for breaching their fiduciary duties.45  The magnitude of this risk is contested 
 
Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 354 (2009) (focusing on the difficulties in 
securing debt financing). 
 42. E.g., Patagonia, a clothing-retailer California benefit corporation sells outdoor clothing as its 
core business.  Some of its social and environmental actions are directly part of its core business (e.g., 
using environmentally preferred materials).  Others are an indirect result of the revenue generated by the 
core business (e.g., donating one percent of sales to environmental organizations).  See J. Haskell Murray, 
Defending Patagonia:  Mergers & Acquisitions With Benefit Corporations, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 485, 
488 (2013) (listing some social and environmental initiatives of the company). 
 43. Anurag Gupta, L3C’s and B Corps: New Corporate Forms Fertilizing the Field between 
Traditional For-Profit and Nonprofit Corporations, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 203, 215 (2011); Steven 
Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance Mechanisms Can Enhance the 
Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW. J.L. & SOCIAL POLICY 170, 174 (2012). 
 44. Anurag Gupta, supra note 43, at 213. 
 45. See Bill Campbell, Equilibrium Capital Group Principal, Testimony before the Or. S. Bus. & 
Transp. Comm. (May 16, 2013) (explaining the narrow definition of fiduciary duties in Delaware and the 
fact that the influence of this on Oregon drove him to join the drafting process for the statute).  See also 
Eric Friedenwald-Fishman, creative director of the Metropolitan group, Testimony before the Or. S. Bus. 
& Transp. Comm. (May 16, 2013) (mentioning the “potential confusion and perception of risk for 
directors” that would be solved by the bill).  In California, the author and B Lab claimed that the bill 
would enable directors to have clarity about the fact that their fiduciary duties would include “creating a 
material positive impact on society and the environment, even in liquidity scenarios[.]”  Hearing on AB 
361, supra note 31, at 4.  Walker, supra note 36, 157 (referencing the concern of director liability by a 
member of the Minnesota Act’s drafting committee).  See also Benefit Corporations: Hearing on AB 361 
Before the S. Banking & Fin. Inst. Comm. (Cal. 2011) (statement of Sen. Juan Vargas, Chairman, S. 
Banking & Fin. Inst. Comm.) (arguments in support of the bill made by the American Sustainable 
Business Council and the Social Venture Network); Clark & Babson, supra note 9, at 825–38.  
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and this paper does not intend to take a stance in the debate about the 
corporate purpose.46  While proponents and some authors argue that 
corporate law mandates that corporations “maximize the (long-term) 
interests of the corporation’s stockholders,”47 others claim that directors are 
allowed to balance both shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ interests and 
that there is no legal requirement to (only) maximize shareholder value.48  In 
any case, this debate and the ensuing legal uncertainty49 was one of the 
reasons why proponents of benefit-corporation legislation believed that a 
statutory intervention was necessary.  Benefit-corporation statutes are thus 
adopted to create legal certainty by shielding benefit corporation directors 
from shareholder suits based on director consideration of the public-benefit 
purpose or stakeholders’ interests.50  
 
 46. The following description is simplified and is not intended to capture all the nuances in this 
debate. 
 47. See, e.g., Clark & Babson, supra note 9, at 825–26; Kristin A. Neubauer, Benefit Corporations: 
Providing A New Shield for Corporations With Ideals Beyond Profit, 11 J. BUS & TECH. L. 109, 112–13 
(2016) (discussing Delaware law); Ian Kanig, Sustainable Capitalism Through the Benefit Corporation: 
Enforcing the Procedural Duty of Consideration to Protect Non-Shareholder Interests, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 
863, 872–78 (2013); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's 
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1176 (1981) (arguing that 
managers have to maximize returns for shareholders); Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent 
Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 177, 177–90 (2008) (arguing that the shareholder 
maximization norm exists, but is only a default rule and is rarely enforced).  
 48. Chu, supra note 9, at 163–81 (discussing corporate law history, articles of incorporations, state 
statutes and state case law to conclude that there is no such thing as a legal requirement to maximize 
shareholder wealth maximization); David Groshoff, Contrepreneurship? Examining Social Enterprise 
Legislation’s Feel-Good Governance Giveaways, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 233, 238–39 (2013); Justin Blount 
& Kwabena Offei-Danso, The Benefit Corporation: A Questionable Solution to a Non-Existent Problem, 
44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 617, 660 (2013) (arguing that there is no legal obligation for managers to (only) 
maximize profits); Cummings, supra note 12, at 587–588 (stating that there is no statutory requirement 
to maximize shareholder value and that the exceptions in takeover and reorganization situations are 
effectively countered by constituency statutes and the business judgment rule).  See also Kent Greenfield, 
A Skeptic’s View of Benefit Corporations, 1 EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 17, 
18 (2014) (arguing that benefit corporation legislation is based on a misinterpretation of the law). 
 49. See Be the Change Oregon Steering Committee, supra note 31, at 4.  The drafters of the Oregon 
benefit company statute acknowledge that lawyers disagree on this issue but that the uncertainty remains.  
They then mention that the statute they have drafted ends this uncertainty.  References to this uncertainty 
are widespread in the literature.  See Chu, supra note 9, at 183 (“ambiguities in the law”); El Khatib, 
supra note 9, 155 and 169 (“uncertainty”); Felicia R. Resor, Benefit Corporation Legislation¸12 WYO. L. 
REV. 91, 95 (2012) (“uncertainty”); Murray, Master, supra note 1, 17 (“confusion”); Walker, supra note 
36, 159 (2013-2014) (“confusion”); Kyle Westaway & Dirk Sampselle, The Benefit Corporation: An 
Economic Analysis with Recommendations to Courts, Boards and Legislatures, 62 EMORY L.J. 999, 1005 
n.26 (2013) (“litigation risks”). 
 50. Chu, supra note 9, 183 (although the author disagrees with the need for benefit corporation 
statutes, she acknowledges the benefit for mission-driven directors in terms of doing away with legal 
ambiguities creating a risk of liability).  Most authors who believe that there is no requirement to 
maximize shareholder value — a requirement that effectively hinders mission-driven companies — 
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c. The Need to Differentiate from Greenwashing Companies. 
 
To explain why legislators choose to create a separate legal entity with 
a duty to pursue the public benefit and to take non-shareholder interests into 
account, the two preceding factors do not suffice.  Other options existed for 
legislators wishing to create more legal certainty for social entrepreneurs.  
For instance, a constituency statute allows, but does not oblige, directors to 
take other stakeholders’ interests into account when making business 
decisions.51  Constituency statutes are a simple way to eliminate the concern 
of shareholder primacy.52  A variant on these statutes — allowing traditional 
corporations to select a socially and environmentally responsible governance 
structure — could have removed the legal obstacles for social 
entrepreneurs.53  
The missing piece of the puzzle is the need for differentiation from 
greenwashing companies — greenwashing being defined as “disinformation 
disseminated by an organization so as to present an environmentally 
responsible public image.”54  Not only do the proponents argue that there is 
 
regard the adoption of benefit corporation statutes as unnecessary.  In their opinion, the traditional for 
profits are suited to accommodate mission-driven companies and creating benefit corporations even 
undermines this possibility.  See El Khatib, supra note 9, 175–181 (pointing to the growing data on the 
success of socially responsible enterprises, the constituency statutes, and the business judgment rule, as 
well as critically reviewing the case law); J. William Callison, Benefit Corporations, Innovation and 
Statutory Design, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 143, 153 (2013) (calling the created dichotomy the “Bipolarity 
Problem”); Groshoff, supra note 48, at 234 (“This Article suggests that SEL [social enterprise legislation] 
is a “con” led by entrepreneurs called ‘contrepreneurs.’  . . .  I argue that contrepreneurs have advanced a 
deceptive maze of needless SEL using ethically-questionable marketing”).  See also Stefan J. Padfield, 
Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 33–34 (2015) 
(warning that pushing socially responsible entrepreneurs to a specific legal entity could marginalize CSR 
and even create “CSR “ghettos”).  But see Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate 
Law and Benefit Corps, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 276, 297 (2012) (calling the shareholder primacy 
norm “ill founded” and “faulty” but considering benefit corporation legislation desirable because this 
legislation promotes pluralism in corporate forms).  
 51. Clark & Babson, supra note 9, at 829–830 (describing constituency statutes).  See El Khatib, 
supra note 9, 164–165 n.72, for references to all (33) states with constituency statutes. 
 52. Chu, supra note 9, 172 (claiming that the shareholder primacy doctrine is effectively invalidated 
in a majority of states which have constituency statutes).  But see Clark & Babson, supra note 9, 831–
833 (deeming the existing constituency statutes insufficient because of the legal uncertainty caused by a 
lack of case law and because they don’t protect mission-driven investors and executives who are in a 
minority position).  
 53. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations — A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 595 (2011) (referring to the Oregon example, see infra note 61). 
 54. Oxford Online Dictionary, 2004, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/greenwash 
[https://perma.cc/UZ6K-A5MG].  Greenwashing is not only targeted at consumers, but also at investors 
and employees.  See, e.g., Jacob Vos, Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Greenwashing in Corporate 
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an increased demand and that there are obstacles hindering the supply but, 
they also often refer to the risk of greenwashing.55  Since companies are 
aware of the value of corporate social responsibility, all claim to act this way, 
causing a decline in trust by the public.56  As mentioned above, investors, 
consumers, and employees are eager to invest in, consume products or 
services of, or work for socially and environmentally responsible 
companies.57  They are even willing to accept a lower return on investment,58 
a higher price on goods or services,59 or a lower wage,60 if they can trust the 
claims made by enterprises.  The main reason for the need of a separate legal 
entity with a duty to pursue public benefit and consider non-shareholder 
interests is the creation of a label of reliability for the companies’ claims 
regarding social and environmental responsibility.61  In other words, the 
 
America, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 673, 674–87 (2009) (about the rise of 
greenwashing, its targets, and its impact) and Eric L. Lane, Greenwashing 2.0, 38 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
280, 283 (2013) (arguing that greenwashing should not only be analyzed through business to consumer 
cases, but also through business to business cases).  For the purpose of this article, greenwashing must be 
construed more broadly as not only creating an environmentally responsible public image, but also a 
socially responsible public image. 
 55. See infra note 51–62 and accompanying text. 
 56. Clark & Babson, supra note 9, at 820 (discussing the fact that the more popular terms in the 
social enterprise sphere are used, the less they mean). 
 57. See supra note 35–38 and accompanying text. 
 58. Craig R. Everett, Measuring the Social Responsibility Discount for the Cost of Equity Capital:  
Evidence from Benefit Corporations, 3 J. BEHAV. FIN. & ECON 55, 69 (2013) (finding that the ninety-four 
founders who were surveyed were willing to accept thirty-five percent less return on equity compared to 
an investment in a regular corporation).  Note that this lower financial return on investment would 
normally be coupled with a higher social return on investment.  See generally Adam Richards, Social 
Return on Investment and Social Enterprise: Transparent Accountability for Sustainable Development, 3 
SOCIAL ENTERPRISE JOURNAL 31, 33–34 (2007). 
 59. See Stephanie M. Tully & Russel S. Winer, The Role of the Beneficiary in Willingness to Pay 
for Socially Responsible Products: A Meta-Analysis, 90 JOURNAL OF RETAILING 255, 262 (2014) (finding 
a mean premium for socially responsible products of 16.8% and that sixty percent of respondents were 
willing to pay at least part of this premium); Plerhoples, supra note 38, at 40 (referring to TOMS Shoes’ 
“buy-one-give-one business model” and the willingness of consumers to pay more because they know a 
second pair will be donated).  See generally Christopher Marquis and Andrew Park, Inside the Buy-One-
Give-One Model, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Winter 2014, at 28, 31–33 (about the positive results of 
this model). 
 60. See Murray, Master, supra note 1, at 52 (suggesting that social enterprises may be able to pay 
their employees less because of “nontangible benefits” and “loan forgiveness programs” which have 
recently been created by business schools such as the Yale School of Management and the NYU Stern 
School of Business, and stating that even without loan repayment, employees may accept a lower wage 
because of the socially and environmentally responsible nature of the enterprise). 
 61. See Plerhoples, supra note 38, at 40 (referring to authors arguing that the branding benefit is 
the main benefit of social enterprise statutes).  See also Joseph W. Yockey, Using Form to Counter 
Corruption: The Promise of the Public Benefit Corporation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 623, 639–40 (2015) 
(expressing his doubts concerning the legal obstacles for social enterprises and naming the branding 
advantages targeting investors, employees and consumers as a “better justification for the PBC”).  See 
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separate legal entity helps to persuade investors, consumers, and employees 
that the company’s socially and environmentally responsible approach is 
genuine, and does not constitute greenwashing.62  
 
d. The Benefit Corporation’s Raison d’Être: Accountability for 
its Social Purpose. 
 
Professor Henry B. Hansmann famously gave a demand-focused raison 
d’être for nonprofits.  He argued that “contract failure” in the market for 
goods and services that are hard to evaluate by consumers, in terms of value 
and quality, needed to be solved by imposing a “non-distribution 
 
also Rujeko Muza, Benefit Corporations: The Need for Social For-Profit Entity Legislation in North-
Dakota, 90 N. DAKOTA L. REV. 581, 595 (2014) (“While constituency statutes afford greater protection 
for directors, they do little for companies, employees, consumers, and shareholders who want to require, 
rather than just permit, directors to consider non-financial interests.”)  But see Clark & Babson, supra 
note 9, at 838 (naming the shareholder primacy norm as one of the two reasons, besides avoiding 
greenwashing).  I argue that shareholder primacy is not a sufficient reason to explain the need for benefit 
corporation statutes (supra note 51–54 and accompanying text).  This may even be more clear in states 
creating benefit LLC’s such as Maryland and Oregon.  In certain states, LLCs are so flexible that authors 
deem them appropriate to be used by social entrepreneurs, see, e.g., Murray, Master, supra note 1, 19; 
Emily Cohen, Benefit Expenses: How the Benefit Corporation’s Social Purpose Changes the Ordinary 
and Necessary, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 269, 273 (2013) (referring to the Uniform Limited Liability 
Act which allows LLCs to have other purposes than for profit purposes).  In Oregon, the adoption of the 
benefit company statute is even more proof of a desire to create a differentiating brand, since Section 
60.047 of Title 7 of the Oregon Revised Statutes already permitted companies to include in their articles 
of association a “provision authorizing or directing the corporation to conduct the business of the 
corporation in a manner that is environmentally and socially responsible.”  This provision was adopted 
in 2007. 
 62. Be the Change Oregon Steering Committee, supra note 31, at 2: The drafters of the Oregon 
benefit company bill mention “differentiat[ing] the company in a confusing marketplace in which 
everyone is claiming to be a responsible or green business” as a benefit of being a benefit company.  In 
California, B Lab and the author of the bill mentioned this differentiation as a benefit of incorporating as 
a benefit corporation, see Hearing on AB 361, supra note 31, at 4.  The United States Green Building 
Council California Advocacy Committee also refers to the general public benefit provisions as a way to 
differentiate benefit companies from companies doing socially and environmentally responsible actions 
as a form of marketing; see S. Banking & Fin. Inst. Comm. Hearing, supra note 45.  See also William H. 
Clark Jr. & Larry Vranka, Benefit Corporation White Paper, at 22 (Jan. 18, 2013) (referring to the 
mandated pursuit of a general public benefit as a protection against greenwashing) http://bene 
fitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit_Corporation_White_Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/WXG6-LHT2].  
See Walker, supra note 36, at 57, where a member of the Minnesota Act’s drafting committee made an 
argument about avoiding greenwashing.  See also Westaway & Sampselle, supra note 49, at 1085 (listing 
“decreased greenwashing” as one of the advantages of benefit corporations because of the heightened 
accountability); Chu, supra note 9, at 183–85 (acknowledging the signaling power of benefit corporations 
to differentiate themselves from greenwashing companies). 
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constraint.”63  Given that nonprofits may not distribute profits to the people 
controlling them,64 consumers are more willing to purchase these goods and 
services, since raised prices or lowered quality would not (directly) benefit 
these people.65  
A similar reasoning can be applied to benefit corporations.  Rather than 
to solve market failure, benefit corporations have been created to exploit a 
market opportunity.  This opportunity lies in the increased demand by 
consumers, investors, and employees for social entrepreneurship.  To be 
useful to exploiting this market opportunity, benefit corporation statutes 
impose their own double constraint: An obligation to (i) take non-
shareholder interests into consideration and (ii) pursue the general and/or 
specific66 public benefit while being profitable.  The true raison d’être of 
benefit corporations is thus supplying a corporate form accountable for its 
socially and environmentally responsible mission in response to the 
increased demand by consumers, investors, and employees.67  
In order to do this, the benefit corporation statutes have created a public 
brand.68  This brand could be defined, by using the oft-used mantra about 
 
 63. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980).  Cf. I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3) (2012) (“no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder 
or individual”). 
 64. Hansmann, supra note 63, at 838 (mentioning “members, officers, directors or trustees”). 
 65. Id. at 843–45. 
 66. Most states follow the MBCL and mandate the pursuit of a “general public benefit,” while 
allowing the companies to set a specific benefit that they want to pursue.  See J. Haskell Murray, 
Corporate Forms of Social Enterprise: Comparing the State Statutes, available at https://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1988556 [https://perma.cc/4BN9-ZQWM], for an overview of 
the states following the MBCL.  A minority of states follow the Delaware statute model, which mandates 
the pursuit of a specific public benefit, but does not require the pursuit of a general public benefit as such, 
see id.  Some authors criticize this approach, see, e.g., El Khatib, supra note 9, at 188, or express their 
concerns about such an approach, see Clark & Vranka, supra note 62, at 22 (referring to the mandated 
pursuit of a general public benefit as a protection against greenwashing).  I, however, agree with Strine 
and Montgomery, who focus on the duty to operate in a “responsible and sustainable manner” and the 
duty to take stakeholder interests into account.  See Strine, supra note 34, at 244.  See also John 
Montgomery, Mastering the Benefit Corporation, BUS. L. TODAY, July 2016, at 1, 3–4.  For the purpose 
of this paper, it is important to note that both models create a brand and that the Delaware model does not 
weaken the brand to an extent that would warrant significantly more lenient accountability. 
 67. Compare Westaway & Sampselle, supra note 49, at 1043 (mentioning the “enhanced 
accountability to purpose and stakeholders” as the raison d’être of benefit corporations) with Frederick 
Alexander, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations: Widening the Fiduciary Aperture to Broaden the 
Corporate Mission, 28 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 66 (2016) (stating, in the context of normal corporations, 
that “while corporations could certainly be good employers and valuable resources to the community, 
that was not their raison d’etre — corporate law was about creating value for the stockholders, who 
owned the corporation, and who elected its managers to oversee their investment”). 
 68. The distinction between “public branding” and “private branding” is made in Murray, Master, 
supra note 1, at 45 (advocating for a strong private brand coupled with a more flexible corporate law).  
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benefit corporations:  Businesses that meet higher standards of corporate 
purpose, accountability, and transparency.69  The influence of this public 
brand should not be underestimated.  Empirical evidence suggests that 
consumers react favorably to brands of companies who support social causes 
for (what are perceived to be) “appropriate reasons.”70  The state’s 
authorization71 to carry the benefit-corporation name may well contribute to 
the perception of legitimacy of a company’s social actions.72  In sum, states 
grant benefit corporations a concession of a brand.  Indeed, this concession 
may well warrant a limited73 and partial74 revival of a modernized concession 
 
Other commentators acknowledge the branding purpose of the benefit corporation law; see, e.g., 
Cummings, supra note 12, at 594, and Walker, supra note 36, at 157. 
 69. This phrase is stated by the proponents of the statutes, e.g., Governor Jack Markell, A New Kind 
of Corporation to Harness the Private Enterprise for Public Benefit, HUFFINGTON POST (July 22, 2013, 
2:06 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gov-jack-markell/public-benefit-corporation_b_3635752.ht-
ml [https://perma.cc/Z4P3-XQ5B] (“Delaware public benefit corporations . . . will have three unique 
features that make them potential game changers.  These three features concern corporate purpose, 
accountability, and transparency”); Jay Coen Gilbert, Can I Get A Witness?! The Evolution of Capitalism, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2011, 7:08 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jay-coen-gilbert/benefit-
corporation-legislation-_b_976650.html [https://perma.cc/4F62-6E34].  Also echoed in the literature: 
e.g., Michelle J. Stecker, Awash in a Sea of Confusion: Benefit Corporations, Social Enterprise, and the 
Fear of “Greenwashing,” J. ECON. ISSUES 373, 376 (2016); Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 29. 
 70. See Michael J. Barone et al., The Influence of Cause-Related Marketing on Consumer Choice: 
Does One Good Turn Deserve Another? 28 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCI. 248, 249 (2000). 
 71. Only a minority of states requires benefit corporations to include the designation of the 
corporate entity type in the firm name.  Murray, Market, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. 
REV. 541, 559 (2016) (listing the states where this is the case but, including Delaware where this 
requirement has been repealed by 250 Del Laws Ch. 40 (S.B. 75)).  Although I agree with Murray that a 
requirement to include the name may help create a stronger brand, id. at 560, I do not think that the 
absence of such a requirement hurts the brand in such a way that would not require any accountability.  
Of the 321 public benefit corporations incorporated in Delaware between August 1, 2015, and August 8, 
2016 (the entry into force of the amendment and the last day incorporations where accounted for in the 
file sent to me by the Delaware Secretary of State’s Office), 241 of 321 public benefit corporations used 
either P.B.C., PBC or Public Benefit Corporation in their firm name.  In Oregon, there are no requirements 
mentioned in the statute concerning the designation as a benefit company.  However, a nonnegligible 
amount of benefit companies with websites referred to their status as benefit company and all benefit 
companies are searchable online.  States requiring benefit corporations to identify their benefit 
corporation status include Minnesota (2012); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-503(4) (2016); and 
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1804.D (2016). 
 72. Alnoor Ebrahim et al., The governance of social enterprises: Mission drift and accountability 
challenges in hybrid organizations, 34 RES. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 81, 86 (2014) (stating — in 
regards to L3C’s, Community Interest Companies and Benefit Corporations — that the legal recognition 
gives more legitimacy to the dual purpose of social enterprises). 
 73. Not implying that corporations are not the product of a contract and only require filing of 
articles of incorporation.  It is not necessarily based on the grant of “permission” to incorporate but rather 
on the grant of a “state-conferred benefit.”  See infra note 75. 
 74. Only applicable to benefit corporations and potentially to other social enterprise statutes. 
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theory75 of the corporation.76  While the criticized old variant focused on 
concession through state regulation,77 the focus for benefit corporations 
should be on accountability.78 
Accountability is thus crucial for benefit corporations and the lack 
thereof could have severe negative consequences.  In the short term, allowing 
the incorporation of benefit corporations without an enforceable 
accountability system would, in effect, create the risk79 of a state-sanctioned 
form of greenwashing.80  On a more long-term basis, if this core rule is not 
enforced, benefit corporations do not respond to the demand in the market.  
 
 75. The concession theory entails that corporations are created through concession by the state, 
rather than by private contracting, see Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liabilities and Theories of the 
Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 85 (1991); Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in 
the Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Cases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 832, 842 (2013); David Ciepley, 
Neither Persons nor Associations: Against Constitutional Rights for Corporations, 1 J.L. & CTs. 221, 
224 (2013). 
 76. See Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 39, 42 (tying the concession theory to benefit 
corporations because of the positive effect of the brand name.).  Cf. Padfield, Silent Role, supra note 75, 
at 842 (mentioning the “state-conferred benefit argument” as a way to tie the concession theory to the 
modern era with simple formations through filings).  But see David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice 
Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social Responsibility after Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197, 
1219–20 (criticizing this “state-conferred benefits” claim in the context of corporate political speech 
based on modern theories of corporate law and the First Amendment).  See Stefan J. Padfield, The Dodd-
Frank Corporation: More Than a Nexus-of-Contracts, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 209, 218–20 (2011), for a 
rejection of Yosifon’s arguments.  See also Padfield, Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 50, 1–
34 (arguing that proponents of mandatory CSR should support the concession theory of corporate 
personality). 
 77. For common criticism about the old variant (and arguments aiming to refute this criticism), see 
Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327, 342–59 (2014).  See id. at 
333, about the focus on regulation.  
 78. J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation:  Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation Law, 
4 HARV. BUS. L. REV 345, 357 (stressing the importance of consistency, monitoring and enforcement to 
maintain a useful brand). 
 79. The proponents of benefit corporation are conscious of this risk and consider the “higher 
standards of corporate purpose, accountability[,] transparency,” the potential liability, and the reporting 
requirements as sufficient to curb this risk.  See Clark & Vranka, supra note 62, at 23–24, and Be the 
Change Oregon Steering Committee, supra note 31, at 4 (acknowledging the risk of greenwashing and 
mentioning the reporting against a third-party standard, imposing a general public benefit purpose and 
the enforcing mechanism as ways to mitigate this risk).  Some commentators have expressed their 
concerns about the accountability system and have argued that it may lead to “legalized greenwashing.”  
See El Khatib, supra note 9, at 181.  See also Murray, Master, supra note 1, at 33 (warning that an 
inappropriate accountability system may cause “an unprecedented amount of rent seeking”).  
 80. In explaining this risk, I do not assume that firms choosing to incorporate as or to convert to 
benefit corporations are per se planning on “greenwashing.”  I merely aim to point out the risk that is 
created by the current legal regime.  Besides, the risk of greenwashing should concern all involved parties.  
The states will only have created a viable corporate entity if its signaling force is reliable, which is 
impossible when there is a high risk of greenwashing.  Existing benefit corporations will also want this 
risk to be limited, because a reliable signaling force is precisely one of the reasons why they decided to 
become a benefit corporation.  
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This would make the corporate form unnecessary.  Investors, customers, and 
employees would first trust the created label of social entrepreneurship.81  
After a while, however, this initial trust would fade and the lack of an 
efficient system of accountability would endanger the sustainability of the 
benefit corporation as a legal entity.82 
 
2.  Accountability requires public reporting 
 
All state legislators use a “transparency-based accountability” model.83  
Although this choice has been criticized in the literature,84 it is the current 
state of the law in all states with benefit corporation legislation and an 
analysis of alternatives would fall outside the scope of this paper.85 
The accountability system comprises two compulsory pillars:  Director 
(and officer) liability and periodic benefit reports.86  However, a description 
of these rules urges a distinction between two different models: The MBCL 
and the Delaware model.87  Some of these differences contribute to the view 
that the Delaware public benefit corporation system is more flexible than the 
 
 81. Currently, the label is used in a figurative sense, although one author has argued for the creation 
of a benefit corporation label (comparable to the label for certified B Corporations) in California.  See 
Sarah Thornsberry, More Burden Than Benefit? Analysis of the Benefit Corporation Movement in 
California, 7 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 159, 186–87 (2013). 
 82. See Reiser, Benefit Corporations, supra note 53, at 622 (stressing the importance of reliability 
of the claims of social value and arguing that the enforcement of the dual mission is critical for this 
reliability); Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J. 681, 735–36 
(2013) (focusing on the importance of enforcement of the different standard of social enterprises). 
 83. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 84. See Cummings, supra note 12, at 578–627 (offering an alternative model of accountability 
based on adaptive learning, internal accountability and accountability to professional peers and to those 
who the corporation claims to benefit); Thomas J. White, Benefit Corporations: Increased Oversight 
through Creation of the Benefit Corporation Commission, 41 J. LEGIS. 329, 346–52 (2015) (advocating 
for the creation of a Benefit Corporation Commission which would act as a more reliable guardian of 
stakeholder interests).  
 85. For some alternatives, other than those in the previous footnote, see, e.g., Michael A. Hacker, 
People Planet and Perversion: The Need for Attorney General Enforcement in Benefit Corporation 
Legislation, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2818855&download=yes 
[https://perma.cc/8YC7-A893]. 
 86. “Officers” is mentioned between brackets because three states — Colorado, Maryland, and 
Tennessee — did not explicitly create a regime for officer liability in benefit corporations.  The MBCL 
also provides for the optional appointment of a “benefit director” and or a benefit officer.  A benefit 
director is an independent member of the board who is in charge of preparing an annual compliance 
statement.  MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 302(c) (2016).  A benefit officer prepares the benefit report 
and has all the powers relating to the creation of general or specific public benefit.  MODEL BENEFIT 
CORP. LEGIS §304(b)(2016).  This optional extra layer will not be discussed further and was not included 
in the Colorado, Minnesota, or Delaware statutes. 
 87. See Appendix I for an overview of all statutes’ public reporting provisions. 
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MBCL.88  
In the following paragraphs, the two compulsory pillars will be 
discussed for both models. 
 
a. Director and Officer Liability Requires Private Reporting. 
 
While the different statutes limit director and officer liability in a number 
of different ways, I will mainly focus on two important factors:  The potential 
plaintiffs and the standard of review.89  
The MBCL provides for a “benefit enforcement proceeding” as the only 
way to claim damages for the failure of a benefit corporation to pursue 
general or specific public benefit, or for other violation of obligations, duties, 
and standards of conduct created by benefit corporation legislation.90  Under 
the MBCL, this suit can be brought by a limited number of plaintiffs:  
 
(1) directly by the benefit corporation; or  
 
(2) derivatively . . . by:  
 
(i) a person or group of persons that owned beneficially 
or of record at least [two percent] of the total number 
of shares of a class or series outstanding at the time of 
the act or omission complained of;  
 
(ii) a director;  
 
(iii) a person or group of persons that owned beneficially 
or of record [five percent] or more of the outstanding 
equity interests in an entity of which the benefit 
corporation is a subsidiary at the time of the act or 
omission complained of; or  
 
(iv) other persons as specified in the articles of 
 
 88. See Plerhoples, Who’s opting in?, supra note 22, at 254 (explaining how this fits in Delaware’s 
corporate law tradition); Murray, Delaware, supra note 78, at 351 (also referring to Delaware’s corporate 
law tradition). 
 89. Other limitations include the limitations in terms of monetary damages; see infra note 113 and 
accompanying text. 
 90. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS § 305(a).  Identical provisions adopted, e.g., in ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
§ 10-2433.A; ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-36-305(a); and CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14601(b), 14623(a).  But see 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.766 (calling this a proceeding against a benefit company, without using the 
term “benefit enforcement proceeding”). 
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incorporation or bylaws of the benefit corporation.91 
 
Some states have the same restrictions but do not provide a threshold of 
percentage of shares for shareholders.  The Oregon statute does not grant 
standing to equity holders of subsidiaries.92  Colorado and Minnesota are 
among the minority of states that do not provide a separate benefit 
enforcement proceeding (from the proceeding used to claim damages for 
director liability)93 and they limit the number of plaintiffs for derivative suits 
even more.  In these states, suits cannot be initiated by directors, affiliated 
companies, or persons mentioned in the bylaws or articles — only 
stockholders satisfying a certain threshold may bring suit.94  Finally, it is 
important to note that most states’ statutes explicitly mention that directors 
(and officers) do not owe any duty to the beneficiaries of their public benefit 
purpose.95 
The MBCL,96 the Oregon statute,97 the Colorado statute,98 the Minnesota 
statute,99 and the Delaware statute100 all apply (some kind of) business 
judgment rule to directorial (and managerial) decisions in benefit 
corporations.  Since the “interests of the corporation” are broadened under 
benefit corporation law,101 this gives directors (and officers) more discretion 
— applying the business judgment rule using a broader “corporate interest” 
gives directors more discretion since they could refer to stakeholder interests 
to justify a decision which harms shareholders.  As such, the main focus of 
 
 91. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS 305(c) (2016).  See also Section (d) of the MBCL for a definition 
of beneficial ownership. 
 92. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623(b); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-36-305(c).  But see OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 60.766, which does not state such a threshold either for regular shareholders and does not provide 
standing to shareholders of subsidiaries. 
 93. See Appendix I. 
 94. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §367.  Colorado has a nearly identical provision.  See COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 7-101-508.  Minnesota does not provide a threshold for shareholders but it does provide the same 
provision in all other respects.  MINN. STAT. ANN. §304A.202.1. 
 95. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.760(5)(c) (governors); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
60.764(3)(c) (officers and managers); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-506(2)(a) (directors); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, §365(b) (directors). 
 96. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS § 301(e) (2016), and explanatory comment by the author 
(referring to the business judgment rule explicitly).  Same provision: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-2432(F).  
 97. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.760(4).  Section 60.760(4) refers to Sections 60.357 and 63.155, 
which state the Oregon variant of the business judgment rule for corporations and LLCs. 
 98. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-506(b). 
 99. MINN. STAT. ANN. §304A.201 subdiv. 4. 
 100. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(b). 
 101. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
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litigation will likely be procedural, rather than substantive.102 
Unless shareholders expressly agree to give standing to other 
stakeholders, only shareholders (and in some states, directors) are able to 
initiate a liability claim.103  This in effect gives shareholders the key to 
safeguard the social and environmental mission of the company.104  To be 
able to fulfil this role, shareholders need information.  It is thus logical to 
require the benefit corporation to present the shareholders with some 
information about their achievements in terms of public benefit.105  To 
achieve that goal, every statute requires benefit corporations to prepare a 
periodic benefit report106 and to send it to the shareholders.107  The content 
of this report differs in the MBCL and the Delaware model108 but both report 
models asses a company’s achievements in pursuit of their public benefit. 
 
b. Efficient accountability requires public reporting. 
 
Even if shareholders are fully informed, however, director (and officer) 
liability is an imperfect instrument to hold benefit corporations accountable 
for their double mission.109  
 
 102. See Kanig, supra note 47, at 899 (emphasizing the strict procedural liability for the failure to 
— at least procedurally — consider non-shareholder interests in board decisions).  
 103. The assumption is that the stakeholders (the community, employees) will, in principle, not be 
shareholders and at least not meet statutory thresholds.  Note the interesting proposal by Alicia Plerhoples, 
supra note 38 (advocating for a requirement to have stakeholders as shareholders in public corporations 
pursuing a charitable public benefit and thus enable certain stakeholders to sue). 
 104. Callison warns that shareholders could also misuse this key and use it as a tool for greenmail.  
Callison, supra note 50, at 154. 
 105. Reiser, Social Enterprise, supra note 82, at 707 (“Information is a precondition for effective 
investor enforcement.”)  Note that only Vermont benefit corporations provide for a shareholder vote about 
the benefit report.  See VT. STAT. ANN tit. 11A, § 21.14(c).  Only if endorsed by a majority of the 
shareholders, will the benefit corporation be able to place the report on the website.  
 106. The report is annual in the MBCL.  MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 401, 402.  The report is 
also annual in Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.768(1)), Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-507(1)), 
Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. §304A.301., subdiv. 1); as well as in all the other states, see Appendix I, 
except in Delaware, where the report is biennial unless the articles or the bylaws require a more frequent 
delivery, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §366(b). 
 107. This is the case in all statutes listed in Appendix I except the Minnesota statute.  Minnesota 
Public Benefit Corporations are technically not obliged to send the report to shareholders.  However, they 
do have an obligation to file the report with the secretary of state’s office, who publishes the report online.  
See MINN. STAT. ANN. §304A.301.1; see also infra note 233. 
 108. Amongst other reasons, because Delaware does not require the use of an independent third-
party standard, see infra note 304 and accompanying text.  While Colorado’s statute is very similar to 
Delaware’s in many respects, it does mandate the use of a third-party standard in the benefit report, see 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-507(1)(b). 
 109. See also Murray, Delaware, supra note 78, 362 n.98 (suggesting that the statute makes the 
proceeding “impotent on purpose” because of the fear of frivolous lawsuits). 
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The first reason is the limited number of potential plaintiffs.  Unless 
shareholders expressly agree to give standing to other stakeholders, they are 
able to keep a de facto monopoly on the standing to initiate a liability suit.110  
Unlike in traditional corporations, however, shareholders are not expected to 
safeguard only their own investments; benefit-corporation shareholders 
might be expected to safeguard a social and environmental mission 
benefitting other beneficiaries.  It seems fair to say that in cases of conflict 
with their own monetary interests, shareholders may not play a perfect 
safeguarding role.111  
This issue is exacerbated by the traditional collective action problems of 
derivative suits.112  While lead-plaintiff shareholders have to bear substantial 
costs, they also must share the benefits with the other shareholders — in 
benefit corporations, also with stakeholders.  Certain states’ monetary-
damages limitations in suits against benefit-corporation directors and 
officers only increase this problem.113  
Moreover, the increased discretion given to directors (and officers)114 
makes it even harder for shareholders to enforce the public mandate.115  
 
 110. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.  The shareholders’ power is shared with the 
directors in some of the states but, in closed benefit corporations, the interests of directors and majority 
shareholders will be aligned. 
 111. See White, supra note 84, at 346 (arguing that the mere right for shareholders to voluntarily 
initiate a benefit enforcement proceeding does not sufficiently safeguard other stakeholders’ interests); 
id. at 347 (explicitly casting doubts about whether shareholders will protect stakeholders’ interest when 
they conflict with theirs); Westaway & Sampselle, supra note 49, 1040–43 (pointing out the problem of 
shareholder under-motivation due to the lack of monetary incentives and the problem of stating a harm 
when there is no economic injury to the corporation — also mentioning the exception of shareholder 
over-motivation if shareholders are also stakeholders); Reiser, Benefit Corporations, supra note 53, at 
613 (pointing to the obvious conflict of interest); Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 45 (expressing 
his doubts about the adequateness of shareholders to defend other stakeholders’ interests, after mentioning 
the problem of conflicts of interests).  See also Groshoff, supra note 48, at 262 (writing with a very critical 
view on shareholders’ willingness to start a benefit enforcement proceeding in case of harm to other 
stakeholders’ interests).  A potential example of the inadequateness of letting shareholders guard the 
interest of stockholders is the fact that only seven percent of California benefit corporations complied 
with the requirements of publicly disclosing their benefit report, according to Murray’s study, although 
California explicitly allows the benefit enforcement proceeding to be used against the failure of a benefit 
corporation to post the annual benefit report.  See CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(b)(3).  
 112. Dana Brakman Reiser, Social Enterprise, supra note 82, at 716 (pointing out that this is even 
more the case than fore traditional corporations because of the limitations in terms of monetary damages).  
See infra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 113. See, e.g., Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.760(5) (governors), Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 60.764(3) (officers)); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.202 subdiv. 1(b).  
 114. See supra note 86. 
 115. See Reiser, Benefit Corporations, supra note 53, at 613.  It will also arguably make it harder to 
enforce the fiduciary duties towards shareholders.  This concern has been expressed by numerous interest 
groups in different states.  See, e.g., S. Banking & Fin. Inst. Comm. Hearing, supra note 45, at 7 
(comments by the Corps. Comm. of the Bus. L. Section of the Cal. State Bar).  
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Therefore, transparency is also necessary to preclude directors (and officers) 
from furthering their own interests and taking advantage of the enhanced 
discretion they have by using stakeholder interests as a false excuse.116  
Given the imperfection of the director (and officer) liability instrument, 
it is not surprising that the MBCL and most states’ statutes mandate public 
availability of the periodic reports.117  All states with such an obligation, 
except for Oregon,118 require benefit corporations with websites to post the 
reports on their websites.119  If they have no website, the benefit corporation 
must send it to any person requesting it, free of charge.120  In Delaware and 
two other states that recently adopted similar statutes, public reporting is not 
mandated by the statute but may be mandated by the company’s certificate 
of incorporation or by its bylaws.121  In Minnesota, public reporting is 
achieved by filing the report with the secretary of state’s office, which 
publishes the reports online.122  
This system of public reporting is aimed at informing other stakeholders 
about the benefit corporation’s public-benefit achievements.123  Informed 
stakeholders are more able to intervene and signal when a company is not 
actually doing what it purports to do.124  Critics of the transparency-based 
accountability system have expressed their concerns about the ability of 
outside stakeholders to monitor benefit corporations’ public mandate.125  
While this monitoring may not be perfect, there are sufficient reasons to 
believe that it would at least add value to the imperfect director (and officer) 
 
 116. See generally, about this risk, Cummings, supra note 12, at 589–90 (arguing that accountability 
is crucial to avoid this); Reiser, Benefit Corporations, supra note 53, at 600. 
 117. See Appendix I. 
 118. Oregon gives companies the choice between publication on the website or on request.  It is 
unclear whether this was intended.  There is no reference to this in the preparatory works.  See OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 60.768(4). 
 119. See Appendix I. 
 120. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS § 402(c).  Note that New Jersey and New York do not provide a 
request procedure.  The statute only mentions that the benefit corporation should post the report on the 
website if it has one.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(c); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1708. 
 121. The two other states are Kentucky and Texas.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §366(c)(2); app. I. 
 122. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §304A.301 subdiv. 1.  See infra note 233 and accompanying text.  
 123. Strine, supra note 34, at 244 (stating that the Delaware statement is targeted at informing 
“investors and other constituencies”). 
 124. Plerhoples called this kind of accountability “indirect,” in the sense that they cannot directly 
sue directors.  See Alicia Plerhoples, Social Enterprise, supra note 25, at 134. 
 125. See infra note 80. 
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liability system.126  Informed consumers can then “vote with their feet”127 or 
use social media and other internet-based applications to express their 
concerns about certain companies’ public-benefit practices.128  Employees, 
who may have sacrificed monetary benefits to work at a social enterprise,129 
will be inclined to enforce the public purpose by sharing their concerns.130  
Other contracting parties such as suppliers could use benefit reports to 
inform their decisions to enter into a contract or to grant discounts.131  
Competitors could sue benefit corporations who issue misleading or 
erroneous reports.132  Finally, potential new investors could use the reports 
to assess the genuineness of a company’s public purpose.133 
 
B. TRANSPARENCY AS A SEPARATE GOAL 
 
The aforementioned “mantra” defining benefit corporations contains 
transparency as the third prong of the added brand value of the benefit 
 
 126. See Brett McDonnell, Committing To Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary Duty in Benefit 
Corporations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19, 64 (2014) (explaining that fiduciary duty constraints 
are insufficient and complemented by reputational constraints, and attributing an important role to benefit 
reports to create this latter constraints). 
 127. By not purchasing goods and services from companies with poor reports.  See Plerhoples, Social 
Enterprise, supra note 25, at 134 (albeit critical because of the lack of standardization).  Cf. Legislative 
Talking Points, B LAB (stating that the benefit report could help consumers make more informed 
decisions), http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/legislative-talking-points [https://perma.cc/5HRR-CPBF]. 
 128. See Stecker, supra note 69, at 378.  See, e.g., Corporate Petitions, CARE 2 PETITIONS, (a petition 
site with a separate page for corporate accountability), http://www.thepetitionsite.com/corporate-
accountability/#hottest [https://perma.cc/C66W-M8PT].  I acknowledge that the existing literature on 
consumer rationality could create doubts as to whether consumers would really intervene.  See generally 
Jacob Jacoby, Is It Rational to Assume Consumer Rationality? Some Consumer Psychological 
Perspectives on Rational Choice Theory, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 81–161 (2000); M. Neil Browne 
et al., Protecting Consumers From Themselves: Consumer Law and the Vulnerable Consumer, 63 DRAKE 
L. REV. 157 (2015).  My claim is not, however, that consumers alone, or even together with other 
stakeholders, will create perfect monitoring.  I merely believe that they would create an added value to 
the director (and officer) liability system.  
 129. See supra note 38. 
 130. If their concerns do not lead to actions, employees could decide to leave to work for other social 
enterprises.  The competition for young employees, who are increasingly concerned with social impact, 
may well be another factor driving companies to comply.  They could also act as whistle-blowers, see 
Stecker, supra note 69, at 378. 
 131. See supra note 37. 
 132. See Stecker, supra note 69, at 378 (mentioning pressure by competitors).  This author also 
mentions other potential policing constituencies — media, consumer protection groups, individuals, 
social and environmental organizations.  See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text about this 
pressure in terms of fraud suits. 
 133. See Legislative Talking Points, supra note 127 (stating that the benefit report could help 
investors make more informed financing decisions). 
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corporation statutes.134  The added value of mandatory public reporting can 
mostly be tied to social enterprises’ need to differentiate themselves from 
greenwashing companies.135 
First, a corporation’s commitment to periodically reporting public 
benefit achievements assessed against a third-party standard diminishes the 
risk of (perceived) greenwashing.136  Second, the choice to opt in to a system 
with costly mandatory disclosure rules may have a strong signaling power.137  
One author argues that the “credibility or signaling power of statutory 
requirements that allow for sanctions” will always be superior to private 
hiring of auditors.138  Hence, transparency may well be a separate goal, as it 
enforces and supports the constraint in a similar manner as the non-
distribution constraint does for nonprofits.139 
 
C. THE BENEFITS OUTWEIGH THE COSTS 
 
Producing a benefit report obviously comes at a cost.  This cost may be 
especially taxing for small enterprises and startups140 and can be divided in 
direct and indirect costs.141 
The direct cost of producing a benefit report is relatively low.  There are 
plenty of free third-party standards142 and third-party certification is not 
mandated.  Obviously, preparing the report will have a certain opportunity 
cost, as it will temporarily divert the attention of one or more employees 
from the core business of the company.  However, benefit corporations have 
committed to put the social purpose at the core of their enterprise.143  It would 
 
 134. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text. 
 136. Cf. Legislative Talking Points, supra note 127 (stating that the reporting requirements help 
prevent greenwashing).  
 137. Joseph W. Yockey, Does Social Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALABAMA L. REV. 767, 821 (2015) 
(comparing this with federal securities laws). 
 138. Id. at 821. 
 139. Ibid. 
 140. For the purposes of this paper, “startup” is used to refer to recently created companies which 
do not necessarily seek exponential growth. 
 141. This distinction is also a distinction between ex-ante costs and ex-post costs. 
 142. The three third-party standards used in the analyzed reports — the B Impact Assessment, the 
Global Reporting Initiative and Green America — are all free.  For links to the pages of these three 
standards and other potential third-party standards, see How do I pick a Third Party Standard, B LAB, 
http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/how-do-i-pick-third-party-standard [https://perma.cc/LU57-U5NP].  
 143. See, for instance, Eric Friedenwald-Fishman Testimony, supra note 45:  “The legislation gives 
companies . . . the legal protection to do good and do well by allowing us to incorporate individual ideals 
of social responsibility and environmental awareness into the very fabric of our companies.”  See also Be 
the Change Oregon Steering Committee, supra note 31, at 4.  By explicitly opting out of the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm, benefit corporations make their social and environmental mission a second 
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thus not make sense to exempt them from publishing a report since their 
commitment to the social purpose, if genuine, implies tracking their 
progress.  Besides, corporations who have a social and/or environmental 
mission will often feel the need to report this to the public.144  Finally, from 
the standpoint of costly reporting as a signaling device, reporting has to bear 
a certain cost to play its role.145  
The indirect costs, such as the legal consequences of a poorly drafted 
report, could potentially be higher.  Many benefit corporations are startups146 
and small companies147 with inherently limited budgets, preventing them 
from hiring expensive lawyers and consultants like listed corporations 
preparing Corporate Social Responsibility reports.148  However, there are 
several ways to mitigate this problem.  The different secretary of state’s 
offices could follow Minnesota’s example and make a template available.149  
Second, while it seems unlikely that mere unintentional misstatements will 
lead to massive litigation,150 in extreme cases of intentionally misleading 
 
bottom line; see Michael Deskins, Benefit Corporation Legislation, Version 1.0-A Breakthrough in 
Stakeholder Rights?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1047, 1050 (2011). 
 144. Chu, supra note 9, at 186.  Chu argues that the reporting requirements impose too much costs 
on corporations who already publish about their impact.  However, she acknowledges that these 
corporations are willing to invest in reporting their impact, which in effect diminishes the extra costs of 
creating a benefit report, especially when the marketing benefits of a reliable benefit corporation label are 
taken into account. 
 145. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.  See Yockey, supra note 137, at 821 
(mentioning that the requirements should be mandatory and backed by sanctions).  I believe it would be 
wrong to say that there is no need for an additional administrative burden for benefit corporations, see, 
e.g., Eric Franklin Amarante, The Colorado Benefit Corporation Act’s Missed Opportunities, at 8, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2030427 [https://perma.cc/74FY-YE2L], if this burden is necessary 
to enforce this double constraint that constitutes the raison d’être for this new legal entity. 
 146. See Appendix II.b, III.b, IV and V.b.  
 147. See id. 
 148. But see Burkhart et al., supra note 23 (finding that 44% of respondent benefit corporations 
“received help from a third-party consultant to address social benefit goals, requirements” but that (only) 
“25% of those respondents think the services were useful in helping to achieve their social benefit goals”). 
 149. Minnesota Public Benefit Corporation / Annual Benefit Report, OFF. OF THE MINN. SEC’Y OF 
STATE, http://www.sos.state.mn.us/media/1934/dcannualbenefitreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST97-QYXD]. 
 150. A practical consideration limiting the risk of actual tort liability for misrepresentations may be 
the small size of most benefit corporations.  It seems unlikely that the plaintiff’s bar would massively 
target companies with very limited assets in a similar way to multinationals, such as in the Kasky v. Nike 
case, as described in Jacob Vos, Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Greenwashing in Corporate 
America, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 673, 690–91 (2009).  Securities fraud claims about 
greenwashing will probably also be hard to bring because of the difficulty to prove materiality and 
causation.  See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Chevron, Greenwashing, and the Myth of 
“Green Oil Companies,” 3 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE & EVN’T 133, 136 (2012).  In my opinion, 
the main litigation risk for socially responsible enterprises will continue to come from claims based on 
labelling of products and advertising slogans, such as the claims alleged in Daugherty v. Method 
Products.  See Class Action Complaint at 18–22, Daugherty v. Method Products, PBC, No. 16-01226 
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statements or fraud, the risk of liability is a socially desirable deterrent.151  
While the public reporting requirement obviously comes at a certain 
cost, these costs are limited and warranted in view of the purpose of the 
benefit corporation legal entity.  Admittedly, some companies will decide 
not to adopt the benefit corporation structure because the costs do not make 
it worthwhile for them.  These costs and the filtering effect they create are 
necessary to allow benefit corporations to differentiate themselves as non-
greenwashing companies.  
 
D. VERY LIMITED ENFORCEMENT 
 
With the importance of transparency in mind, it is flabbergasting that the 
enforcement mechanisms are as limited as they are. Most states’ statutes, 
with Minnesota as a notable exception,152 provide very limited guarantees.153  
The MBCL requires the filing of the report with the secretary of state’s 
office, but less than half of the states have mandated this and a minority of 
these states have provided for an explicit sanction for not filing.154 Only a 
handful of states explicitly make the benefit-enforcement proceeding 
available for claims regarding the publication of the benefit report155 but, it 
seems that the language of the other statutes that create benefit-enforcement 
proceedings implicitly make the proceedings available for such claims.156   
 
(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2016), ECF No. 1.  See also Vincent v. People Against Dirty, PBC, http://www.mpp 
settlement.com [https://perma.cc/NA3D-EPLN]. 
 151. See Stecker, supra note 69, at 378 (mentioning anti-fraud suits as a way to make sure that benefit 
reports are accurate); McDonnell, supra note 126, at 33–34 (mentioning the importance of anti-fraud suits 
as a way to monitor the reliability of the reports and suggesting that Rule 10b-5 will probably be 
applicable).  See also Steven Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation:  How Traditional Governance 
Mechanisms Can Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW. J.L. & SOCIAL POLICY 170, 194 
(2012) (arguing for explicit statutory sanctions for directors including false or misleading information in 
the benefit report); Clark & Babson, supra note 9, at 847 (2013) (mentioning that directors are already 
subject to litigation for fraud or intentionally misleading statements and considering this as “ a sufficient 
incentive to provide complete and accurate benefit reports”). 
 152. See infra note 233–235 and accompanying text. 
 153. An example of the limited enforcing is described by Murray, Delaware, supra note 78, at 359 
n.82 (describing how a Maryland benefit corporation claiming to be the first benefit corporation in the 
world failed to comply with the requirement to post the report online).  Maryland’s secretary of state’s 
website has listed this corporation as “forfeited” (last visited, Jan. 18. 2017). 
 154. See infra Appendix I for an overview of the 13 states which require filing, the fee they charge, 
and the timing of this filing.  See the same Appendix for a listing of the different sanctions provided by 
the statutes. 
 155. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(b)(3); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1402(2); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 33-1351(3); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78B.030(3); W. VA. CODE ANN. 31F-4-403(a).  See also 
Appendix I. 
 156. The MBCL defines “benefit enforcement proceeding” as: “Any claim or action or proceeding 
for (1) failure of a benefit corporation to pursue or create general public benefit or a specific public benefit 
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The effectiveness of this enforcement mechanism, however, is highly 
doubtful, theoretically,157 and Professor Murray’s early study indicated that 
the enforcement is insufficient in practice.158  The hypothesis that the 
existing enforcement mechanism does not lead to a (sufficiently) high 
compliance rate, will also be tested in Part II. 
 
II.  PUBLIC REPORTING DATA 
 
In this part, I focus on the actual data of public reporting by benefit 
corporations.  The majority of the literature agrees on the important role of 
transparency but the prevailing assumption — that benefit corporations will 
actually publish these reports — needs examination.  Some pre-existing data 
suggests that there is an acute problem in benefit reporting that may 
undermine the sustainability of benefit corporations.159  After a short review 
of this pre-existing data, I present and analyze the data I collected in Oregon, 
Colorado, Minnesota, and Delaware about the number of reporting 
companies, as well as a number of other variables, such as companies’ 
principal place of business, date of incorporation as a proxy for corporate 
age,160 third-party certifications, and number of employees as a proxy for 
size.  I have also tried to analyze industries as a variable but the limited 
information available prevented a determination of industry with sufficient 
certainty to include this variable in my analysis. 
I chose Oregon, Colorado, Minnesota, and Delaware because they 
represent the majority of the different approaches states have taken with 
regards to public benefit reporting.161  Oregon mandates public reporting, lets 
 
purpose set forth in its articles; or (2) violation of any obligation, duty, or standard of conduct under this 
[chapter].”  MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102 (emphasis added).  The comment under this section of 
the MBCL clarifies that one of the obligations enforceable through the benefit enforcement proceeding 
is the obligation to post the report on the website or provide it on request.  All states that have adopted 
this broad definition of benefit enforcement proceeding have thus arguably implicitly made the 
proceeding available to enforce this obligation.  See Appendix I for an overview. 
 157. See supra notes 89-116 and accompanying text for the concerns regarding the efficiency of the 
benefit enforcement proceeding. 
 158. See infra notes 166-169 and accompanying text. 
 159. See id. 
 160. This proxy is imperfect since it counts corporations who reincorporated as benefit corporations 
or were created by merger of acquisition as new corporations.  However, it is the best available proxy to 
evaluate this variable and it is the proxy used by earlier articles analyzing the same variable.  See 
Plerhoples, Who’s Opting In?, supra note 22, at 260 (acknowledging the imperfection but noting, id. at 
n.60, that the date of incorporation still refers to the original date of incorporation, even in case of 
conversions and pointing to the lack of websites as an indication of the high number of startups); Eric L 
Talley, Corporate Form and Social Entrepreneurship: A Status Report from California (and Beyond), 9, 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2144567 [https://perma.cc/UN5F-73S8]. 
 161. Furthermore, they were offering the data for free. 
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companies choose between website publication and publication-by-request, 
and does not provide for explicit sanctions for not reporting.162  Colorado 
mandates public reporting, requires companies with websites to post their 
report online, and does not mention any legal sanctions for non-reporting.163  
Minnesota mandates filing benefit reports with the secretary of state’s office 
and provides a sanction for noncompliance.164  Finally, Delaware makes 
public reporting optional.165 
 
A. PREEXISTING DATA 
 
In a 2015 article,166 Professor Murray describes how he looked for the 
benefit reports of the benefit corporations formed in 2012 in California, 
Hawaii, New York, and Virginia — both on websites and by contacting 
representatives, or the registered agent of, the corporations.167  He found a 
compliance rate of between eight percent and ten percent (if he leaves out 
the nonresponsive companies).  Furthermore, Professor Amarante found that 
only one of the 697 Nevada benefit corporations has complied and published 
its benefit report online.168  The compliance level in Maryland is reported to 
be low as well.169 
 
B. OREGON 
 
1. Legal Background 
 
Section 60.768 of the Oregon Revised Statutes requires benefit 
companies to prepare an annual benefit report and send it to their 
shareholders.170  It also obliges benefit companies to either make all of their 
benefit reports available on “the publicly accessible pages of the benefit 
company’s website” or to provide a copy of the most recent benefit report 
without a charge to a person requesting it “unless providing a copy would 
 
 162. See infra notes 170-75 and accompanying text. 
 163. See infra notes 211-14 and accompanying text. 
 164. See infra notes 233-35 and accompanying text. 
 165. See infra notes 250-51 and accompanying text. 
 166. Murray, Early Report, supra note 13.  
 167. He did the actual search in July 2014.  Id. at 33. 
 168. Eric Franklin Amarante, Why does Nevada Have so Many Benefit Corporations? [Blog Post] 
(the results will be presented in a future article), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstra-ct_id=2897684 [https://perma.cc/PZ23-64HH].  See infra note 281 and accompanying text 
for one potential reason for this low compliance in Nevada. 
 169. See Burkhart et al., supra note 23. 
 170. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.768(1) and (3). 
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violate a provision of applicable law.”171  Oregon is the only state that 
mandates public reporting but does not mandate companies with websites to 
post their reports on their website.172  The Oregon statute does not mention 
an explicit deadline for the report to be posted or sent173 and does not provide 
for an explicit sanction for noncompliance.174  Finally, Oregon is the only 
state I analyzed where both corporations and LLCs can adopt the benefit 
company form.175 
 
2. Hypothesis 
 
Formulating a realistic hypothesis as to the benefit-reporting compliance 
rate requires a comparison of the states mentioned above with the Oregon 
regulatory regime.  Since Oregon lets both corporations and LLCs opt for 
the benefit company status, one would expect to see smaller companies and 
thus less resources to produce a benefit report.  Furthermore, since my data 
set was larger and surfaced a larger time span, the influence of early adopters 
— who may even have lobbied for the passing of the bill — may be more 
limited, leading to a lower percentage of compliance.  On the other hand, I 
granted the companies five more months to comply.176  Also, my study is 
done approximately two years after Professor Murray’s so the learning costs 
may have dropped, leading to a higher compliance rate.  Therefore, I believe 
that the differences with Murray’s study balance each other out so I have set 
the hypothesis at ten percent compliance. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
I analyzed the 133 benefit companies which were created before 
December 31, 2014, and listed as active benefit companies on Oregon’s 
Secretary of State’s website on January 6, 2017.177  By choosing this cut-off 
 
 171. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.768 (4).  It is uncertain what provision would warrant such an 
exception. 
 172. See Appendix I. 
 173. Ibid. 
 174. Although Section 60.766(1) of the Oregon Revised Statutes arguably implicitly makes the 
derivative suit against directors available in case of not publication of the report.  See also supra note 156 
for states which create a benefit enforcement proceeding. 
 175. The only other state providing this option is Maryland. 
 176. In July 2014, Murray looked at reports of companies incorporated in 2012.  In January 2017, I 
looked at reports of companies incorporated in 2014 or before. 
 177. The list contained 139 companies but I manually checked each company’s page on the secretary 
of state’s website and six other companies were inactive, although still counted as active in the DOS excel 
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date, I wanted to make sure that, in the absence of a statutory deadline,178 the 
corporations had enough time to publish a report. 
My methodology consisted of searching for each company’s website by 
browsing the internet and looking for a benefit report on this website.  I 
carefully looked at every relevant page of the websites and counted the 
companies that posted their benefit reports.179  In January 2017,180 I sent 
emails, letters, social-media messages, and messages through contact forms 
to all companies whose benefit report I had not been able to locate, formally 
requesting that they send me their report.181  In February 2017, I sent a 
reminder to the companies who still had not sent me their reports.182  
Additionally, I used publicly available information to collect data on 
other variables, including companies’ principal place of business,183 date of 
incorporation as a proxy for corporate age,184 third-party certifications,185 and 
 
file.  The six companies are DP Staffing LLC, DP Packaging LLC, Xedecnation LLC, Goes LLC, Sweet 
Spot Yoga LLC, and Fabienne Photography & Design LLC. 
 178. The Oregon statute provides a deadline of 120 days after the end of the company’s fiscal year 
or concurrently with the delivery of the annual report to shareholders.  There is no such statutory deadline 
to post the report online or make it available to the public.  OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.770(3) and (4).  
 179. While this method does not offer a guarantee that I did not miss a benefit report, I believe that 
if a careful researcher is unable to locate the report, it is unlikely that an average third party (be it a 
potential consumer or supplier) would be able to locate it.  Furthermore, in the communications sent to 
companies whose benefit reports I was not able to locate, I asked them to point me to the section of their 
website where they did post it, in case I missed it. 
 180. Between January 5 and January 9, 2017, I tried to contact all the companies in a time period of 
about ten days, to make sure they would not quickly create a report prompted by other companies in the 
small social enterprise sphere.  See Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 34, for a similar concern and 
methodology. 
 181. To limit the costs and the environmental impact of my study, I did not send letters to companies 
whose email address I had or that I could contact through email, a contact form or through social media.  
For the letters, I used the addresses I found on the secretary of state’s office website.  When address of 
principal place of business and mailing address where different, I sent a letter to both. 
 182. I had to use letters for 80 companies.  Some of them were returned to me with the message 
“undeliverable as addressed,” “insufficient address,” “no such number” and “forward time exp.”  I sent 
new letters to the addresses mentioned on the secretary of state’s website, tried to contact individual 
members and founders and tried to find new addresses.  The fact that some companies’ address does not 
seem to correspond with a real address, that their forwarding time is expired etcetera does not exclude 
that they would have shared this information if I had the opportunity to call them, but the fact that I, as a 
member of the public (and “any person”) am not able to receive their report on request makes them 
noncompliant. 
 183. Principal place of business is derived from the secretary of state’s website (collected on Jan. 6 
2017). 
 184. The date of incorporation is derived from the companies’ page on the secretary of state’s 
website (collected on Jan. 6, 2017).  See supra note 160 about this proxy. 
 185. I checked whether the benefit companies in the sample were certified by B Lab as B 
Corporations or certified by Green America.  For the B Corporation certification, I used the Find a B 
Corp, B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/community/find-a-b-corp [https://perma.cc/6QW2-8HBY], 
webpage and searched for the benefit company names.  I also checked the companies listed under 
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number of employees as a proxy for size.186  I have not been able to determine 
the number of employees for every company, limiting company-size 
results.187  I applied the chi-squared test with Yates’s correction for 
continuity, as well as Fisher’s exact test to establish whether the differences 
in reporting across the different variables are significant.  I set the level of 
significance at 0.05. 
When assessing whether a company complied with the mandatory 
publication of a benefit report, I have shown leniency and have decided not 
to disqualify reports because they lack information mandated by the 
statute.188  In general, when a company published a document, called it 
“benefit report,” and included most of the required information, I have 
considered this as a compliant company.189  Of course, there is no statutory 
obligation to use the expression “benefit report” and documents with a 
comparable content have also been accepted as compliant.190 
Furthermore, even if I chose December 31, 2014, as a cut-off date, 
aiming to compare compliance with regards to the 2015 report, I have shown 
some leniency here as well.  Companies that published a 2014 report but not 
a 2015 report have also been counted as compliant.191  I believe that this 
leniency is legitimate because the statute does not provide a deadline to 
publish the report.192  
Although some leniency is shown with regards to the satisfaction of the 
content requirements and with regards to the timing, I do not believe it would 
be legitimate to accept B Impact Reports as sufficient to comply with the 
benefit reporting requirement in Oregon.  These B Impact Reports are 
prepared for certified B Corporations but lack the narrative description 
 
“Oregon.”  Screen captures of the pages on B Lab website are on file with the author.  For the Green 
America certification, I searched for the benefit companies names on the Green America website 
(National Green Pages, GREEN AMERICA, http://www.greenpages.org/).  Screen captures of the pages on 
Green America’s website are on file with the author.  I also checked every company’s website (if existing) 
to check whether they mentioned another certification.  I did not count product certifications or local 
sustainability certifications, because they do not assess both social and environmental issues. 
 186. Firm size is mostly derived from the LinkedIn pages of the companies and sometimes from 
their websites (screen captures on file with the author). 
 187. This is related to the general limitation following from the private nature of most benefit 
corporations. 
 188. See Appendix II.a for a more detailed description of which legal requirements were complied 
with by the different benefit corporations. 
 189. See Appendix II.a for an overview of how every compliant benefit corporation met the legal 
requirement. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.  
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prescribed by the statute.193  Furthermore, B Impact Reports are not 
published every year, but rather every two years. To be sure, being a B 
Corporation is a sign of the willingness to be transparent but it does not in 
itself imply compliance with benefit company requirements. 
 
4. Results 
 
The compliance rate is slightly higher than the hypothesis.  Nineteen 
(14%) of all benefit companies complied, fourteen did this via their website, 
and five sent their report on request.194  Twenty-five percent of the 
incorporated benefit companies complied, while approximately eleven 
percent of the benefit LLC’s complied.195  The compliance percentage would 
only rise to seventeen percent after elimination of all companies that have 
been administratively dissolved since the data set was composed196 and to 
thirty-three percent after exclusion of companies without active websites. 
The compliance rate is significantly higher among converted benefit 
companies (53%) than among companies which incorporated as benefit 
companies (6%).197  
Many early adopters complied.  For instance, all six companies 
designated in 2013 have complied.198  The compliance rate among 
companies designated as such before the end of January 2014 is sixty-five 
percent,199 while only five percent of the other 113 companies complied.  
This difference is statistically significant.200 
I only found a number of employees for thirty-six of the 133 benefit 
companies.  All of them fall below the 500 employees limit used by the 
Office of Advocacy of the U.S. Small Business Administration to define 
 
 193. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.768(1) and (3).  The website does include “Company Highlights” 
which are, however, extremely limited, not specified per year, and not included for all companies. 
 194. See Appendix II.b. 
 195. Ibid. 
 196. The data set I chose inherently represents a snapshot.  Removing these companies from the data 
set altogether would not be warranted given the fact that nineteen of the 133 companies in the data set 
have filed for reinstatement at least once after been dissolved by the secretary of state. 
 197. The p-value is lower than 0.0001, both with Fisher’s exact test and the chi-square test with 
Yates’ continuity correction.  See infra II.6 summarizing table. 
 198. While the statute entered into force on January 1, 2014, companies could make the necessary 
filings before and some are officially designated as benefit companies in December 2013. 
 199. Thirteen out of twenty companies complied. 
 200. The p-value is lower than 0.0001, both with Fisher’s exact test and the chi-square test with 
Yates’ continuity correction.  See infra II.6 summarizing table. 
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small businesses.201  The majority of these benefit companies were even part 
of the category of microbusinesses, 202 with between 1 and 10 employees.203  
Among the companies I could find a number of employees for,204 I noticed 
a trend of increasing compliance when moving to categories with more 
employees.205  The compliance level is thirty-three percent in companies 
with one to ten employees, seventy-eight percent in companies with eleven 
to fifty employees, and one-hundred percent in companies with more than 
fifty employees.206  It is impossible to know, however, whether this trend is 
representative for the whole population. 
Twenty of the 133, or fifteen percent of the analyzed benefit companies, 
are certified by a third-party.207  The difference in compliance between 
benefit companies certified by a third-party (60%) and the non-certified 
benefit companies (6%) is statistically significant.208 
Finally, ninety-eight percent of the benefit companies have their 
principal place of business in Oregon.209  The difference in compliance with 
companies having their principal place of business out of state is not 
significant.210  
 
C. COLORADO  
 
1. Legal Background 
 
Section 7-101-507 of the Colorado Revised Statutes requires public 
benefit corporations to prepare an annual benefit report and to send it to their 
 
 201. See Appendix II.b.  See Office of Advocacy, Frequently asked questions, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS 
ADMINISTRATION, https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/SB-FAQ-2016_WEB.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/3XXQ-85KU]. 
 202. Two-thirds of the benefit companies I found a number of employees for had between one and 
ten employees.  Office of Advocacy, The Role of Microbusinesses in the Economy, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS 
ADMINISTRATION, https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/Microbusinesses_in_the_Economy.pdf, [http 
s://perma.cc/R5BQ-5QB5].  
 203. See Appendix II.b. 
 204. Ibid. 
 205. Ibid. 
 206. See Appendix II.a. 
 207. Ibid.  Sixteen are only B Corporations, two are only certified by Green America, and two are 
certified by both B Lab and Green America. 
 208. See infra II.6 Summarizing table.  The p-value is lower than 0.0001 both with Fisher’s exact 
test and the chi-square test with Yates’ continuity correction.  See infra II.6 summarizing table. 
 209. See Appendix II.b. 
 210. See infra II.6 Summarizing table.  The p-value values with Fisher’s exact test and the chi-square 
test with Yates’ continuity correction are respectively 1.00 and 0.905.  See infra, II.6 summarizing table. 
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shareholders.211  It also obliges public benefit corporations with websites to 
make all of their benefit reports available on “the public portion of its 
website.”212  Public benefit corporations without websites have to provide a 
copy of their most recent benefit report without a charge to persons 
requesting them.213  The Colorado statute lacks an explicit deadline for 
sending or posting the report and does not provide any statutory enforcement 
mechanism for the failure to do so.214 
 
2. Hypothesis 
 
Since Colorado has a public reporting system similar to the one in the 
states Professor Murray analyzed, I set the hypothesis at ten percent. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
On February 9, 2017, I searched the Colorado Secretary of State’s 
database for all public benefit corporations that had their public benefit status 
before December 31, 2014.215  After eliminating the dissolved and delinquent 
corporations, the data set contained 19 active public benefit corporations.216 
I applied the same method as for Oregon benefit companies.  In February 
2017,217 I checked the public benefit corporations’ websites and sent emails, 
letters, and messages through contact forms to all corporations without a 
website to request a copy of their most recent benefit report.218  A couple of 
weeks later, I sent a reminder to the companies who had not sent me their 
report or answered my request. 
Just as for Oregon, I used publicly available information to collect data 
about other variables, such as third-party certifications,219 date of 
 
 211. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-507(1) and (3). 
 212. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-507(4). 
 213. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-507(5). 
 214. See Appendix I. 
 215. The Colorado statute requires public benefit corporations to include either PBC, P.B.C., or 
public benefit corporation in its domestic entity name.  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-503(4).  I then 
entered these three designations in the search engine and eliminated the corporations that had these 
designations in their name without actually being public benefit corporations. 
 216. All delinquent public benefit corporations had this status for more than six months. 
 217. More precisely, on February 10, 2017. 
 218. Indeed, all public corporations with a website and without benefit report are noncompliant. See 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-507(4).  Unlike Oregon benefit companies, see supra note 172, Colorado 
public benefit corporations cannot choose between online publication or publication on request.  Hence, 
I only sent emails or letters to the public benefit corporations that did not have a website. 
 219. See supra note 185.  I applied exactly the same method as for Oregon.  See supra note 185.  
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incorporation as a proxy for corporate age,220 and principal place of 
business.221  I was not able to track the size of enough companies to include 
this variable in the analysis.222  I applied the chi-square with Yates’s 
continuity correction and Fisher’s exact test to establish whether the 
differences in reporting across the different variables are significant and I set 
the level of significance at 0.05. 
Finally, when evaluating documents issued by the corporations, I applied 
the same leniency as I did for benefit companies in Oregon, with regards to 
both content and timing of the report.223 
 
4. Results 
 
Again, the compliance rate is slightly higher than the hypothesis. Two 
of the nineteen, or eleven percent of all public benefit corporations 
complied.224  One did this by posting its report on the website; the other had 
no website and send its report on my request.225  This compliance rate only 
rises to 12.5% if companies without websites are excluded. 
One out of three converted and one out of sixteen incorporated public 
benefit corporations complied.226  The difference is not statistically 
significant.227  There is no statistically significant difference between the 
corporations that filed for public benefit corporation status in the first 
month.228 
Only public benefit corporations certified by a third party complied.229  
The difference in compliance between public benefit corporations certified 
 
 220. The date of incorporation is derived from the secretary of state’s office website. 
 221. The principal place of business is derived from the secretary of state’s office website. 
 222. I only found a number of employees for three public benefit corporations, namely Jason Wiener, 
P.C., a Public Benefit Corporation (1), Ecospire, PBC (1-10), and Vention Resources PBC (3). 
 223. See infra Appendix III.a.  The Colorado statute also does not provide for a deadline and requires 
the benefit report to include a narrative description.  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-507(1). 
 224. See Appendix III.b. 
 225. Id.  See Appendix III.b. 
 226. Id.  See Appendix III.b. 
 227. See infra II.6 summarizing table.  The p values with Fisher’s exact test and the chi-square test 
with Yates’ continuity correction are respectively 0.298 and 0.706.  See infra II.6 summarizing table. 
 228. See infra II.6 summarizing table.  The p values with Fisher’s exact test and the chi-square test 
with Yates’s continuity correction are respectively 1.000 and 0.706.  See infra II.6 summarizing table.  
The comparative lack of statistical significance in Colorado when compared with the other states is 
striking.  While it is unclear what the source of this difference is, one hypothesis may be the very small 
number of observations in Colorado, as compared to the other states. 
 229. See Appendix III.b. 
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by a third party (100%), and the noncertified public benefit corporations 
(6%) is not statistically significant.230 
Finally, ninety-five percent of the public benefit corporations had their 
principal place of business within the state of Colorado.231  The difference in 
compliance with companies having their principal place of business out of 
state is not significant.232 
 
D. MINNESOTA 
 
1. Legal background 
 
Section 304A.301 of the Minnesota Statutes requires public benefit 
corporations to prepare an annual benefit report and to send it to the secretary 
of state before every April 1.233  The secretary of state revokes the public 
benefit corporation’s status for failure to file this report.234  There is no 
requirement to send the report to the shareholders, but the secretary of state 
publishes the reports online.235 
 
2. Hypothesis 
 
The Minnesota statute requires filing of the report with the secretary of 
state’s office236 and requires the secretary of state to revoke the public benefit 
corporation status of corporations which fail to file their benefit report.237  
Therefore, I expected a one-hundred percent compliance level. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
On February 28, I crossed a list of sixty-seven Minnesota public benefit 
 
 230. See infra II.6 summarizing table.  The p values with Fisher’s exact test and the chi-square test 
with Yates’ continuity correction are respectively 0.105 and 0.186.  
 231. See Appendix III.b. 
 232. The p values with Fisher’s exact test and the chi-square test with Yates’s continuity correction 
are respectively 1.00 and 0.186. 
 233. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.301, subdiv. 1 and § 304A.301, subdiv. 5. 
 234. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.301, subdiv. 5 (reinstatement).  Reinstatement is possible (subdiv. 
6), intentional failure creates a right for shareholders to receive the fair value of their shares (subdiv. 7) 
and public benefit corporations have to change their corporate name (subdiv. 8). 
 235. 2015 Public Benefit Corporation Annual Reports, OFFICE OF THE MINNESOTA SECRETARY OF 
STATE STEVE SIMON, http://www.sos.state.mn.us/business-liens/business-liens-data/public-benefit-cor 
porations-annual-reports-2015/ [https://perma.cc/RY7L-ZQPY].  
 236. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.301 subdiv. 1. 
 237. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.301 subdiv. 5. 
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corporations active on August 8, 2016,238 with the secretary of state’s office 
database and found thirty-six active public benefit corporations that existed 
before December 31, 2015.239  Minnesota only allowed the filing for public 
benefit corporation status starting in January 2015, necessitating placing the 
cut-off date one year later.  Minnesota’s clear deadline for filing each year’s 
report allowed this later cut-off date.240  
The Minnesota Secretary of State publishes the benefit reports of all 
public benefit corporations annually on its webpage.  I consulted this 
webpage and matched every report with the relevant corporation. 
Just as for Oregon and Colorado, I used publicly available information 
to collect information about other variables, such as third-party 
certifications,241 number of employees as a proxy for size,242 date of 
incorporation as a proxy for corporate age,243 and principal place of 
business.244  I have not been able to determine the number of employees for 
every company, which limits the results in terms of company size.245  
 
4. Results 
 
My hypothesis regarding compliance is confirmed.  All thirty-six public 
benefit corporations filed their reports with the secretary of state’s office and 
they are all available online.246  While I have no data about public benefit 
corporations whose status may have been revoked for failing to file a report, 
it is certain that one-hundred percent of active public benefit corporations247 
complied with the requirement.  
Finally, ninety-seven percent of the public benefit corporations have 
 
 238. I first consulted the list mentioned on List of MN PBC’S, HULI CONSULTING (list current as of 
Aug. 10, 2016), http://www.huliconsulting.com/mn-pbc-list/, and then eliminated the benefit 
corporations that were inactive on February 28, 2017. 
 239. Twenty-six of these public benefit corporations were specific benefit corporations, while 10 of 
them were general public benefit corporations.  Specific public benefit corporations fall under a more 
flexible legal regime, comparable to Delaware’s (e.g., no mandatory use of a third-party standard) except 
for the obligation to file an annual report with the secretary of state’s office.  General public benefit 
corporations fall under a regime that is more comparable to the MBCL. 
 240. See supra note 233. 
 241. See supra note 185.  I applied exactly the same method as for Oregon, see supra note 185. 
 242. Firm size is mostly derived from the LinkedIn pages of the companies and sometimes from 
their websites (screen captures on file with the author).  
 243. The secretary of state’s office website mentioned the date of incorporation. 
 244. Principal place of business is derived from the website of the companies and sometimes from 
publicly available databases. 
 245. This is related to the general limitation following from the private nature of most benefit 
corporations. 
 246. See Appendix IV. 
 247. On February 28, 2017. 
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their principal place of business within the state of Minnesota.248  Since all 
companies complied, breaking down the compliance in terms of the other 
variables is superfluous.249  
 
E. DELAWARE 
 
1. Legal background 
 
Section 366 of the Delaware General Corporation Law mandates that 
public benefit corporations, at least biennially, prepare a “statement as to the 
corporation's promotion of the public benefit or public benefits identified in 
the certificate of incorporation and of the best interests of those materially 
affected by the corporation's conduct” (i.e., a public benefit statement) and 
to send it to their shareholders.250  The default rule does not mandate making 
this statement available to the public, but the certificate of incorporation or 
bylaws may require this.251  The statute does not mention the way the 
statement should be made available to the public. 
 
2. Hypothesis 
 
Since the publication of a public benefit statement is not compulsory, the 
hypothesis has to be conceived differently.  My hypothesis is that five 
percent of the public benefit corporations make this information available to 
the public. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
On October 19, 2016, the Delaware Secretary of State’s office sent me a 
list of all the public benefit corporations which had been filed.252  After 
elimination of the surrendered, dissolved, converted, forfeited, and voided 
companies, I had a data set of 161 public benefit corporations filed before 
December 31, 2014.253  
 
 248. See Appendix IV. 
 249. See Appendix IV for a breakdown. 
 250. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b). 
 251. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(c). 
 252. E-mail from Lora J Nacrelli to Maxime Verheyden (Oct. 19, 2016, 11:04 AM) (on file with 
author). 
 253. I eliminated the public benefit corporations listed as such in the file authored by April Wright, 
who works at the Secretary of State of Delaware.  The file dates from October 2016 and was posted on 
the Data World database, https://data.world/newco/newco-mission-statements [https://perma.cc/B7BU-
JQUB], in November 2016.  The surrendered, dissolved, and converted status is voluntary, so I decided 
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In January 2017,254 I sent emails, letters, social-media messages, and 
messages through contact forms to all companies whose benefit statement I 
was not able to locate on the internet.  I inquired whether they had opted for 
voluntary disclosure and if so, whether they were willing to send me their 
statement.255  In February 2017, I sent a reminder to the companies who had 
not sent me their report or answered my question. 
Just as for Oregon, Colorado, and Minnesota, I used publicly available 
information to collect data about other variables, such as companies’ third-
party certifications,256 number of employees as a proxy for size,257 date of 
incorporation as a proxy for corporate age,258 and principal place of 
business.259  I have not been able to determine the number of employees for 
every company, limiting the results in terms of company size.260  I applied 
the chi-square test with Yates’s continuity correction, as well as Fisher’s 
exact test to establish whether the differences in reporting across the different 
variables are significant.  I set the level of significance at 0.05. 
Finally, when evaluating documents issued by the corporations, I applied 
the same leniency as I did for benefit companies in Oregon, with regards to 
both content and timing of the report.261 
 
4. Results 
 
Again, the reporting rate was slightly higher than the hypothesis:  Eight 
percent.  Seven percent reported via the website and one percent sent me 
 
to leave them out of my data set.  Forfeited is a status for companies without a registered agent.  I checked 
and all the companies with this status did not have a registered agent on January 8, 2017.  I decided to 
still send out letters and emails to void companies.  If one of them had responded, I would check whether 
they had regularized their situation. 
 254. From January 9 until January 11, 2017. 
 255. For eighteen companies, the only address I found was the registered agent’s.  None of them 
responded.  Some letters were returned to me, but the reasoning of note 180 applies here as well: If I, as 
a regular member of the public, am unable to contact them to find the report, it is not publicly available. 
 256. See supra note 185.  I applied exactly the same method as for Oregon.  
 257. Firm size is mostly derived from the LinkedIn pages of the companies and sometimes from 
their websites (screen captures on file with the author).  
 258. The date of incorporation was available in the file sent to me by the Delaware secretary of 
state’s office. 
 259. Principal place of business is derived from the website of the companies and sometimes from 
publicly available databases. 
 260. This is related to the general limitation following from the private nature of most benefit 
corporations. 
 261. See infra Appendix V.a.  The Delaware statute made “making the statement available to the 
public” optional and does not mention anything about a deadline if a corporation’s articles or bylaws 
require such publication.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §366(c)(2).  This would thus be something that 
could be stipulated in these articles or bylaws.  
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their report on request.262  This reporting rate would only rise to eleven 
percent if all of the companies without websites and the companies that I 
only contacted the registered agents for would be excluded. 
Of those reporting, fewer incorporated as public benefit corporations 
originally (5%) than those that converted to the public benefit status (15%). 
The difference in reporting between converted and incorporated companies 
is not statistically significant.263 
A substantial portion of reporting corporations were among the first to 
file for the public benefit corporation status.  Five of the fourteen that filed 
on the first day have published their report.  The reporting rate of public 
benefit corporations designated as such within one month after the entry into 
force of the statute is twenty-six percent, compared to five percent for later-
designated public benefit corporations.  This difference is statistically 
significant.264 
I have found the number of employees for ninety-seven of the 161 public 
benefit corporations.  All of these companies, except one, fell below the 500-
employee threshold for small businesses.265  The majority of these companies 
were microbusinesses with between one and ten employees.266  Among the 
companies I found a number of employees for,267 I noticed a trend of 
increasing compliance in categories of companies with a higher number of 
employees.  Eight percent of corporations with one to ten employees, 14.29% 
of corporations with between one and fifty employees, and thirty-three 
percent of the corporations with more than fifty employees reported.268  It is 
impossible to know, however, whether this trend is representative for the 
whole population. 
Twelve percent of the analyzed public benefit corporations are certified 
by a third-party.269  The voluntary disclosure level is forty-percent for this 
group.270  The difference in compliance between public benefit corporations 
 
 262. See infra Appendix V.b. 
 263. See infra II.6 summarizing table.  The p-value is 0.090 with Fisher’s exact test and 0.1290 with 
the chi-square test with Yates’s continuity correction.  See infra II.6 summarizing table. 
 264. See infra II.6 summarizing table.  The p-value is 0.004 with Fisher’s exact test and 0.003 with 
the chi-square test with Yates’s continuity correction.  See infra II.6 summarizing table. 
 265. See infra Appendix V.a.  The only exception was Rasmussen College, Inc., a Public Benefit 
Corporation, with between 1,001 and 5,000 employees. 
 266. See infra Appendix V.a. 
 267. These are the ninety-seven companies mentioned above. 
 268. See infra Appendix V.b. 
 269. See infra Appendix V.b.  Note that this does not include Ian Martin PBC (an American 
subsidiary of a Canadian certified B corporation) or the subsidiaries of People Against Dirty, PBC (People 
Against Dirty Manufacturing, PBC and Method Products, PBC).  See also infra note 357–58 about groups 
of benefit corporations. 
 270. See infra Appendix V.b. 
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certified by a third party (40%) and the non-certified public benefit 
corporations (3%) is statistically significant.271  
I found princip place of business addresses for 122 public benefit 
corporations.  The principal places of business of the public benefit 
corporations are dispersed over at least272 twenty-two states.  Forty-nine of 
122 (or 40% of) public benefit corporations have their principal place of 
business in California.273  Only three have their principal place of business 
in Delaware.  
  
 
 271. See infra II.6 summarizing table.  The p-value is lower than 0.0001, both with Fisher’s exact 
test and the chi-square test with Yates’ continuity correction.  See infra II.6 summarizing table. 
 272. I was unable to locate the headquarters of thirty-seven public benefit corporations. 
 273. See infra Appendix. V.b. 
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F. SUMMARIZING TABLE 
 
STARTUP  THIRD-PARTY CERTIFICATION 
Oregon 
Converted Reported 
Did not 
report 
Oregon Third-party 
certification Reported Not reported 
Converted 13 12 Certified 12 8 
Incorporated 6 102 Not certified 7 106 
Fisher 
p-value 
(Two-
tailed) 
< 
0.0001 Fisher 
p-value 
(Two-
tailed) < 0.0001 
Chi square with 
Yates correction 
p-value 
(Two-
tailed) 
< 
0.0001 
Chi square with 
Yates correction 
p-value 
(Two-
tailed) < 0.0001 
Colorado 
Converted Reported 
Did not 
report 
Colorado Third-
party certification Reported Not reported 
Converted 1 2 Certified 1 0 
Incorporated 1 15 Not certified 1 17 
Fisher 
p-value 
(Two-
tailed) 0.298 Fisher 
p-value 
(Two-
tailed) 0.105 
Chi square with 
Yates correction 
p-value 
(Two-
tailed) 0.706 
Chi square with 
Yates correction 
p-value 
(Two-
tailed) 0.186 
Delaware 
Converted Reported 
Did not 
report 
Delaware Third-
party certification Reported Not reported 
Converted 6 34 Certified 8 12 
Incorporated 7 114 Not certified 5 136 
Fisher 
p-value 
(Two-
tailed) 0.090 Fisher 
p-value 
(Two-
tailed) < 0.0001 
Chi square with 
Yates correction 
p-value 
(Two-
tailed) 0.129 
Chi square with 
Yates correction 
p-value 
(Two-
tailed) < 0.0001 
Minnesota 
converted Reported 
Did not 
report 
Minnesota third-
party certification Reported 
Did not 
report 
Converted 14 0.000 Certified 5 0.000 
Incorporated 22 0.000 Not certified 31 0.000 
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EARLY ADOPTERS SIZE   
Oregon early 
adopter Reported 
Did not 
report Oregon size Reported Not reported 
Early adopters 13 7 1-10 employees 8 1
Other 6 107 11-50 employees 7 
Fisher 
p-value 
(Two-
tailed) 
< 
0.0001 51+ employees 3 
Chi square with 
Yates correction 
p-value 
(Two-
tailed) 
< 
0.0001 Unknown 1 9
Colorado early 
adopters Reported 
Did not 
report Colorado size Reported Not reported 
Early adopters 0 3 1-10 employees 2 
Other 2 14 11-50 employees n/a n/a 
Fisher 
p-value 
(Two-
tailed) 1.000 51+ employees n/a n/a 
Chi square with 
Yates correction 
p-value 
(Two-
tailed) 0.706 Unknown 0 1
Delaware early 
adopters Reported 
Did not 
report Delaware size Reported Not reported 
Early adopters 6 17 1-10 employees 4 4
Other 7 131 11-50 employees 5 3
Fisher 
p-value 
(Two-
tailed) 0.004 51+ employees 4 
Chi square with 
Yates correction 
p-value 
(Two-
tailed) 0.003 Unknown 0 6
Minnesota early 
adopters Reported 
Did not 
report Minnesota size  Reported Did not repor
Early adopters 16 0 1-10 employees 14 
Other 20 0 11-50 employees 3 
  51+ employees 3 
  Unknown 16 
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G. ANALYSIS 
 
A first look at the data urges a distinction between the findings in 
Oregon, Colorado, and Delaware where the reporting rates were low and in 
Minnesota where the reporting rate was high.  
 
1. Oregon, Colorado, and Delaware 
 
In line with earlier findings of low reporting rates in Hawaii, California, 
New York, Virginia, Nevada, and Maryland, I have found low reporting rates 
in Oregon (14%) and Colorado (11%).  The reporting rate is even lower in 
Delaware (8%), where public reporting is optional.  These reporting rates all 
remain low after exclusion of some companies that may be more likely to be 
inactive or less likely to respond.  In Oregon, for instance, these reporting 
rates remained low (only 33%) after eliminating both subsequently-
dissolved companies and companies without websites.274  In Colorado, 
eliminating the companies without websites only led to a 1.5% increase.275  
In Delaware, excluding the corporations without active websites and the ones 
where only the registered agent was contacted leads to a slight increase to 
eleven percent.276  
In the following paragraphs, I discuss some potential reasons for these 
low reporting rates.  In order to do that, I cross the reporting rates with the 
other collected variables, and I use the answers given by the noncompliant 
responding companies 
 
a. Learning Costs 
 
The first potential explanation mentioned by Professor Murray to 
explain low compliance rates are the learning costs associated with the new 
requirements for benefit corporations.277  Some benefit corporations’ 
answers suggest that they lack knowledge about their reporting duties.  For 
instance, some Oregon benefit companies seemed not to know what exactly 
 
 274. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 275. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text. 
 276. This might be necessary to mitigate the risk that the eighteen letters sent to registered agents 
did not reach the companies, that the used addresses are based on online and unofficial sources, and to 
compensate the fact that some letters were returned to me. 
 277. Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 43. 
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a benefit report is.278  Besides these spontaneous reactions, there is a more 
quantitative data point to support the learning cost argument.  There is a 
significantly higher percentage of reporting among early-adopters in both 
Oregon and Delaware.279  A substantial number of these early-adopter 
compliers were B Corporations and were thus better informed about benefit 
corporation reporting requirements.280  A final aspect related to learning 
costs, which takes it to a more worrying extreme, is that a subset of the 
benefit companies may well have been “nudged into noncompliance.”281  
Indeed, Oregon’s model articles of incorporation and articles of organization 
make the election of benefit company status dependent on the mere checking 
of a box.282  This has probably led a significant number of the benefit 
companies to choose the benefit company status without fully realizing the 
legal consequences.  My analysis showed that four of the eleven 
noncompliant Oregon benefit companies who responded did not know they 
were benefit companies before I contacted them. 
 
 
 
 278. One respondent just sent me a URL that included factual information about socially and 
environmentally responsible policies, without any periodic element to it, while benefit reports are 
inherently periodic and even annual in the case of Oregon.  Interestingly, their policy document (dated 
June 13, 2014) included reference to the goal to publish an annual report in addition to their sustainability 
page.  They had not done this more than two years later.  Another respondent simply and asked what a 
benefit report is. 
 279. See supra notes 200, 264, and their accompanying text.  As mentioned above, this is not the 
case in Colorado.  The reasons for this are unclear.  
 280. Fourteen of the twenty benefit companies designated as such in Oregon within the first month 
after the entry into force of the statute where B Corporations.  Nine of them complied.  Nine of the twenty-
three Delaware public benefit corporations filed in August were B Corporations and four of them 
disclosed.  Some even actively supported the adoption of the benefit company bill.  Equilibrium Capital 
Group, Celilo Group Media, and Metropolitan Group were signatories of the Be the Change Steering 
Committee’s letter and representatives of these companies were members of the Committee which drafted 
the document.  Be the Change Oregon Steering Committee, supra note 31, at 6.  Cf. Talley, supra note 
160, at 7 (describing the high number of incorporations in the first month in California as an example of 
“inventorying,” meaning that new benefit corporations were already prepared before the statute took 
effect). 
 281. See Amarante, supra note 168 (suggesting that a majority of the Nevada benefit corporations 
have chosen the status unintentionally because of the way the incorporation process is set up — checking 
a box and adding a public benefit without any control and limited information — and will fail to comply 
with the legal requirements, including the reporting requirements).  See also J. MacLeod Heminway, 
Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held U.S. Benefit Corporations, 40 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 611, 613–14 (2017) (suggesting unintentional filings as benefit corporations in Tennessee and 
Colorado). 
 282. See Oregon Articles of Organization (mentioning that additional requirements apply), 
http://sos.oregon.gov/business/Documents/business-registry-forms/llc-articles.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7 
QJ-9GRZ]; Oregon Articles of Incorporation, http://sos.oregon.gov/business/Docu-ments/business-
registry-forms/dbc-articles.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NB2-Z3FW]. 
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b. Startups 
 
The statistically significantly higher reporting percentage among 
converted benefit corporations in Oregon283 indicates that startup companies 
have a harder time reporting about their impact.284  Besides this statistical 
difference, respondents explicitly voiced motives for nonreporting that were 
related to their startup status.  Two Oregon respondents explicitly referred to 
startup-related reasons to explain their noncompliance,285 and ten of the 
forty-three Delaware respondents used similar explanations for their lack of 
voluntary reporting.286 
 
c. Small Size 
 
Murray also points to the small size of benefit corporations.287  Although 
data about size was only found for a limited number of benefit corporations, 
the data gathered here reveals that all but one of those companies are small 
enterprises.288  The majority are even microbusinesses.289  In Oregon and 
Delaware, there seems to be a trend to more compliance when moving from 
a category of smaller companies to a category of larger companies.290  The 
only exception is Colorado, where both of the complying corporations were 
in the smallest category.  However, I did not find enough size data in 
Colorado to determine whether or not this was simply a reflection of the 
smaller size of the population in general.  The general trend of lower 
compliance of smaller companies is in accordance with prior research in 
other domains of corporate reporting showing low reporting compliance 
rates by smaller corporations.291 
 
 283. See supra note 197.  
 284. The difference is not statistically significant in Colorado.  The reasons for this remain unclear 
but the small sample size seems to be a contributing factor.  There was no statistically significant 
difference in Delaware either. 
 285. One respondent mentioned the lack of real activity in the marketplace.  Another respondent 
referred to the fact that his company was still in the “survey process.” 
 286. These motives included e.g., the too recent launch of the company to assess the impact, only 
recently achieved profitability (where the specific public benefit was to share some of these profits) and 
mentioning that the company is in “development stage.” 
 287. See Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 43–44 (pointing to the fact that a large number of 
corporations did not have a website and that the complying companies included larger ones, such as 
Patagonia and Greyston Bakery). 
 288. See supra, II.6 summarizing table. 
 289. Id. 
 290. See supra notes 205 and 269. 
 291. See, e.g., Matthew P. Harrington & Eric A. Lustig, IRS Form 8300: The Attorney-Client 
Privilege and Tax Policy Become Casualties in the War Against Money Laundering, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
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d. Third-party certification 
 
As expected, the reporting level is higher among companies that have 
been certified by a third-party.292  This difference is statistically significant 
in Oregon, Colorado, and Delaware.  Certified corporations are usually 
among the largest companies.293  Furthermore, they usually have more prior 
knowledge about benefit corporations because of their close relation with B 
Lab.  Hence, the high number of compliant certified B Corporations 
reinforces the company size and the learning costs as reasons for 
noncompliance. 
 
e. Absence of Statutory Enforcement 
 
Furthermore, Professor Murray suggested that the absence of real 
statutory enforcement also contributed to low compliance results.294  While 
California has explicitly made the benefit enforcement proceeding available 
to assert claims regarding the failure to post a report, the low reporting rate 
implies that this enforcement mechanism is insufficient.295  Oregon 
implicitly makes a liability suit available for nonreporting, but this tool also 
seems to have very limited effects.296  The contrast with Minnesota, a state 
with an actual enforcement mechanism297 and perfect compliance is striking.  
 
f. Industry 
 
Due to the limited information that was available, it was impossible to 
classify companies in industries with sufficient certainty to include this as a 
variable.298 
 
623, 636 n.57 (1996) (mentioning a 42% compliance rate for small corporations (less than 10 million 
dollars in assets) for the filing of form 8300 (reports of cash payments over $10,000). 
 292. See supra note 160 about using a company’s incorporation date as a proxy for corporate age. 
 293. Of the Delaware corporations I found a number of employees for, only thirty-five percent of 
certified B Corporations are in the microbusinesses group (1-10 employees), while this is the case for 
fifty-two percent of the total population.  Of the Oregon corporations I found a number of employees for, 
this was the case for 31.25% of certified B Corporations and sixty-six percent for the whole population.  
While the only B Corporation in Colorado is small, there is insufficient data about other public benefit 
corporations size in that state. 
 294. See Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 44–45.  
 295. See also infra note 323 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra notes 156 and 174; Appendix II.b. 
 297. See Appendix I for an overview of the statutes. 
 298. This is a potential area of further research. 
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g. Principal place of business 
 
Although there is no significant difference in reporting between out-of-
state companies and domestic companies, the analysis of the principal places 
of business did reveal an interesting finding.  Unlike in Oregon, Colorado 
and Minnesota,299 the majority of Delaware public benefit corporations have 
their principal place of business in another state.300  A quick comparison of 
these results with the very-low percentage of out-of-state public benefit 
corporations and benefit companies incorporated in Colorado, Minnesota, 
and Oregon indicates that Delaware is winning at least part of the 
competition for public benefit corporation charters.301  Further research is 
needed to show whether or not this becomes a trend and whether or not the 
victory will be as big for Delaware as its dominance over large and listed 
corporation charters.302  
 
h. Third-Party Standards 
 
A first finding is that not all reporting companies use a third-party 
standard.  Currently, the majority of states, including Oregon and Colorado, 
require the use of a third-party standard in the benefit report.303  A minority, 
including Delaware, make the use of a third-party standard optional.304  
Compliance with the third-party standard requirement is far from perfect in 
states where the standard is mandatory.  The compliance rates vary from 
fifty-eight percent in Oregon to fifty percent in Colorado.  In states where 
the standard is optional, there is a striking difference between Delaware, at 
sixty-four percent, and Minnesota specific public benefit corporations (see 
supra, footnote 239), at zero percent. 
Further, most companies that published a benefit report and used a third-
 
 299. See Appendices II.b., III.b. and IV.  See also Talley, supra note 160, at 8 (finding that only 5% 
of the California Benefit Corporations and Flexible Purpose Corporations were headquartered out of 
state). 
 300. See Appendix V.b. 
 301. Interestingly, the majority of these out of states corporations could have incorporated as a 
benefit corporation in the state where they have their principal place of business.  See also Delaware 
Committee Report, Purpose of the Bill (mentioning the potential incentives for the formation of new 
corporations in Delaware as a reason for adopting the bill).  
 302. In 2015, eighty-six percent of the corporations based in the United States which did an initial 
public offering were incorporated in Delaware.  Sixty-six percent of the Fortune 500 companies were 
incorporated in Delaware.  See Jeffrey W. Bullock, Delaware Division of Corporations 2015 Annual 
Report, https://corp.delaware.gov/Corporations_2015%20Annual%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3W2 
Y-5DGJ]. 
 303. See Appendix I 
 304. See Appendix I. 
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party standard used the B Impact Assessment,305 confirming the position of 
B Lab as the market leader.  Although many alternatives exist,306 and B Lab 
explicitly refers to them,307 there still exists a sentiment that the requirements 
for third-party standards may have been written with the B Impact 
Assessment in mind.308  
Finally, a couple of companies mentioned the inadequateness of the 
available third-party standards to measure the impact created by their 
specific company.  Indeed, social impact standards are in their infancy.  One 
respondent referred to the difficulties involved with the assessment of carbon 
impact.309  Some companies solve this problem by developing their own key 
performance indicators to supplement the incomplete third-party standard.310  
This too may come at a cost since it seems likely that some companies 
decided, when faced with this problem, to simply not report.311  The issue of 
inadequacy of the existing standards is mentioned in the literature as well.312 
The low level of reporting companies is not the only concern regarding 
benefit reports.  The concern about limited enforceability of the content 
requirements expressed in the literature seems to be confirmed in practice.313  
 
 305. Seven of the nine compliant companies in Oregon which used a third-party standard used the 
one offered by B Lab.  In Delaware, six of the seven voluntary reporting public benefit corporations using 
a third-party standard used B Lab’s.  See Appendix II.a and V.a.  Although early commentators have 
indicated that product certifiers and others may decide to enter into the market, the competition remains 
limited. 
 306. See supra note 142. 
 307. On the website and in legislative documents.  See How do I pick a Third Party Standard, supra 
note 142; Be the Change Oregon Steering Committee, supra note 31.  But see Groshoff, supra note 48, 
at 266–65 (stating that “B Lab attempts to create legislation that will coerce entities to pay funds to B Lab 
for legally questionable certification tools”). 
 308. See, e.g., Renatto Garcia, Re-Engineering Georgia’s Corporate DNA: A Benefit Analysis and 
Practicality Assessment for Benefit Corporation Legislation in Georgia, 6 J. MARSHALL L.J. 627, 658 
(2012) (arguing that for benefit corporation legislation to serve its purpose, the measures of accountability 
and transparency should be set by a “party without bias or interest”).  
 309. This was a representative of an Oregon benefit company. 
 310. This was, for instance, the case for Exemplar Companies, a Delaware public benefit 
corporation. 
 311. One Delaware public benefit corporation, for instance, explained how they had found it 
challenging to aggregate the benefits their company created and that this was the reason for the lack of 
voluntarily compliance.  This partially confirms Yockey’s assumption that in absence of efficient 
enforcement, companies that have a hard time measuring impact will not or only partially disclose.  See 
Yockey, supra note 137, at 796. 
 312. See Westaway & Sampselle, supra note 49, at 1077 (acknowledging the potential of 
inaccurateness of impact measurement).  See also Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 48 (about the 
inherent difficulties to prescribe reporting of objective information for companies coming from a range 
of different industries); Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate 
Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1011–12 (2013).  See generally Yockey, supra note 137, at 796 (about 
the challenge of “interpreting social information in firms with social complex missions”). 
 313. See Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 46 (the levels of uses of third-party standards). 
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Some even argue that the existing content requirements are insufficient.314  
While it is clear that the content requirements and the enforcement 
mechanism could be ameliorated, I will not go into further detail about the 
appropriate statutory amendments to pursue this goal.  Such proposals would 
need to be informed by a careful study of the existing third-party standards 
and an evaluation of a larger sample of benefit reports. 
 
2. Minnesota 
 
The analysis of the Minnesota data teaches that the statutory sanction of 
revocation of the public benefit corporation status has led to reporting by all 
active companies.  While it is uncertain how many times the secretary of 
state has actually had to use this sanction,315 Minnesota shows that it can 
induce all active companies to report.  Further, the requirement to file the 
benefit report, coupled with the review by the secretary of state and the 
severe sanctions for noncompliance have led to a substantially higher level 
of compliance with the third-party standard requirement.  Ninety percent of 
the Minnesota general public benefit corporations complied, while only 
fifty-eight percent of the Oregon benefit companies and fifty percent of the 
Colorado public benefit corporations complied.316 
Yet, the low number of active public benefit corporations in Minnesota 
suggests that this perfect compliance has its price.  
It seems unlikely that the three other states would be able to retain or 
attract the same number of corporations if they would sanction companies 
like Minnesota does.  Minnesota’s population of public benefit corporations 
are more likely to exhibit the characteristics associated with compliance.  For 
example, the percentage of converted companies is higher (39%) than in 
Oregon (19%), Colorado (15%), and Delaware (25%).  Minnesota also has a 
higher percentage of companies with more than fifty employees (15%), than 
Oregon (8%), Colorado (0%), and Delaware (13%).  Finally, Minnesota’s 
percentage of certified corporations (13.8%), is higher than Colorado’s (5%) 
and Delaware’s (12.4%), and it’s quite close to Oregon’s (15%). 
 
 
 
 
 
 314. See Yockey, supra note 137. 
 315. Three public benefit corporations have been reinstated, according to the website. 
 316. Admittedly, the voluntary use of a third-party standard is very low (0%), compared to the sixty-
four percent in Delaware.  This probably also stems from the fact that the reporting benefit corporations 
in Delaware are the eight percent who want to do more than legally required. 
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III.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
A. MANDATING PUBLIC REPORTING 
 
Public reporting is an essential piece of the accountability system 
because it enables outside stakeholders to monitor benefit corporations and 
to partially ameliorate the imperfect director (and officer) liability system.317  
Furthermore, it has a strong individual signaling power.318  I have argued 
that, in general, the benefits strongly outweigh the costs.319  The voluntary 
system in Delaware has not led to a higher reporting rate than the mandatory 
systems in other states.320  Therefore, my first recommendation is to mandate 
public reporting.  
 
B. THE ENFORCEMENT-SUSTAINABILITY TRADE-OFF 
 
Before discussing my other recommendations, it is important to briefly 
describe the “enforcement-sustainability trade-off.”  On the one hand, my 
results demonstrate that the reporting levels are low in states without real 
enforcement.  Compliance is perfect, however, in Minnesota, where the 
secretary of state provides actual enforcement.  On the other hand, Minnesota 
only had sixty-seven active public benefit corporations twenty-one months 
after the entry into force of its statute.321  This number is too small to provide 
the aura of reliability that social entrepreneurs seek.  More adopters are 
necessary for the benefit corporation to be a sustainable corporate form.  The 
Minnesota experience suggests that creating actual enforcement without 
considering the practical difficulties experienced by some benefit 
corporations will likely deter entrepreneurs from choosing the benefit 
corporation legal form. 
 
C. ENFORCING PUBLIC REPORTING 
 
One of the reasons for the lack of compliance with the public reporting 
requirements is the lack of enforcement.322  Private enforcement through 
director (and officer) liability has proven to be insufficient, which is not 
 
 317. See supra, Part I.1.2.  
 318. See supra Part I.2. 
 319. See supra Part. I.3. 
 320. The fact that all reporting rates are low is not an argument against mandating such reporting 
but, rather shows some practical problems and lack of enforcement, which urge policy recommendations.  
 321. List of MN PBC’S, supra note 238. 
 322. See supra notes 294-97, and accompanying text. 
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surprising given the aforementioned limits in terms of standing.323  In 
particular, the low compliance rate in California, a state that explicitly 
provided this kind of enforcement seems to confirm these presumptions. 
 
1. Enforcement Mechanism 
 
To be able to enforce the public reporting requirement, states need 
information.  Thus, obliging benefit corporations to file their benefit report 
with the secretary of state’s office is necessary.324  Mandatory filing of the 
report could further increase the level of compliance by requiring the use of 
a third-party standard if the state refuses to file incomplete reports.325  This 
would be beneficial for the quality and the comparability of the reports.  
However, it is not sufficient since it does not assure the publication of benefit 
reports.326  
States should mandate filing of reports on an online database or 
website.327  Currently, only Minnesota makes the benefit reports of its public 
benefit corporations available online.328  Such a database would ensure actual 
public availability in a more reliable way than the current combination of 
posting the report on the website or providing it on request.  This is shown 
in practice by the one-hundred percent availability of reports in Minnesota.  
The large number of non-responsive companies elsewhere,329 shows that the 
option to choose to make the report available on request merely creates an 
illusion of public availability.  Moreover, the efforts and the slowness 
currently represent an important hurdle for stakeholder monitoring.  On 
 
 323. Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 49–50.  See supra notes 89-95, and accompanying text. 
 324. Currently, fourteen of the thirty-one statutes requiring filing of the report with the secretary of 
state’s office.  See infra Appendix I for an overview of the 14 states who require filing, the fee they 
charge, and the timing of this filing.  Some commentators have pleaded for a filing requirement, see 
Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 47 (combining this suggestion with the need for sanction in case 
of noncompliance); Garcia, supra note 308, at 673 (arguing that a filing requirement serves the ends of 
accountability and transparency, while advocating for an exception if the Secretary of State is not able to 
handle the processing of these reports); Hacker, supra note 85.  
 325. See infra note 326. 
 326. It could also inform states about the way benefit corporations are interpreting and applying the 
statutory requirements in terms of content of the benefit report.  This would enable states to adapt these 
requirements or, potentially, sanction unsatisfactory reporting.  Rhode Island already has a procedure of 
evaluation of the annual report.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.3-13(e).  (If it does not fit the requirements, the 
secretary of state sends it back).  See OFF. OF THE MINN. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 149.  In this 
template, the secretary of state’s office mentions that certain information is required in the benefit report 
and that the office may return incomplete reports unfiled. 
 327. See Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 50, 50 n.135 (for the same suggestion).  In footnote 
135, Murray addresses the problem of extra costs.  
 328. OFFICE OF THE MINNESOTA SECRETARY OF STATE STEVE SIMON, supra note 235. 
 329. See Appendices II.b, III.b, and V.b. 
2_VERHEYDEN_FINAL (1).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2018  12:18 PM 
88 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 14:1 
 
average, it took reporting benefit corporations thirty-one days after my first 
request to send me their report.330  Requiring every company to post their 
report online is not a satisfying alternative either.  Even if all companies 
wanted to report on their website, the accessibility of these webpages in the 
future is a concern.  This can be avoided with a public database that features 
documents in a more permanent format.  Besides enhancing the 
comparability of benefit reports,331 it would strengthen the role of liability 
for intentional misrepresentations, since such documents are usually more 
easily admissible in court.332  
This system obviously entails a certain cost for the states.  Different ways 
to offset these costs include charging a higher filing fee333 or cooperation 
with private parties such as B Lab.334  States could also save costs by 
adapting their existing databases or simply creating a different webpage and 
posting the reports there, as Minnesota did. 
 
2. Sanctioning Noncompliance 
 
Besides mandating filing of the benefit report with the secretary of 
state’s office and publishing the reports in a database, states should create 
real sanctions for the failure to send the reports.  In this section, I suggest a 
set of potential sanctions. 
First, the traditional method of imposing fines as sanctions could be 
used.335  Additionally, noncompliant benefit corporations may be sanctioned 
with the retraction of all tax advantages given by the state.  Although such 
 
 330. Interestingly, the average time was shorter for respondents contacted through regular mail 
(twenty-nine days on average) than those respondents contacted via email (thirty-four days on average).  
 331. See Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 50–51.  
 332. MARK BAGNOLI ET AL., NOT ALL CSR REPORTS ARE CREATED EQUAL: REPORT QUALITY AND 
VOLUNTARY THIRD-PARTY ASSURANCE 1 (Purdue U. Krannert Graudate Sch. of Mgmt., 2016) (stating 
that pdf files are accepted as evidence in American courts, whereas regular webpages are not), http:// 
www.krannert.purdue.edu/academics/Accounting/bkd_speakers/papers/BHW.pdf [https://perma.cc/2F7 
V-WKMM]. 
 333. See infra Appendix I for the fees that are currently charged.  After all, by publishing these 
reports on a publicly accessible forum, the state helps the branding and marketing purposes sought by 
social entrepreneurs. 
 334. This kind of public service by B Lab could be even more warranted in light of its partial funding 
(between one million and five million dollars) by the United States Agency for International 
Development.  See Our Funders, B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-
corps/the-non-profit nonprofit-behind-b-corps/our-funders (last visited Apr. 19, 2017). 
 335. Currently, Rhode Island is the only state imposing fines.  It imposes a twenty-five dollars per 
report filed late.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.3-13(f) (2016).  See also Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 
48 (suggesting fines). 
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tax advantages are not yet widespread336 and most literature has focused on 
removing disadvantages for benefit corporations,337 it seems likely that other 
states will consider doing this to try to win the competition for benefit 
corporation charters.338  Tax advantages would be given because of the social 
mission of benefit corporations and would not be warranted if benefit 
corporations are not complying with transparency requirements.  Repetitive 
noncompliance could also be sanctioned with administrative dissolution,339 
 
 336. The only advantage for benefit corporations as such is the California Benefit Corporation 
Discount applicable to California Benefit Corporations who are in good standing.  The discount takes the 
form of a four-percent adjustment of bids made by Benefit Corporations for the purposes of determining 
the highest ranked bid when bidding for city contracts.  S.F., CAL., MUN. CODE, CAL. BENEFIT CORP 
DISCOUNT ORDINANCE § 14C.3.  
 337. In particular, authors have focused on the competitive disadvantage for benefit corporations 
compared to tax-exempt nonprofits because they would only be able to deduct a maximum of ten percent 
of their taxable income as a charitable contribution.  See IRC § 170 (b).  See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 61, 
at 308 (advocating for a ‘benefit expense’ as a way to offer an unlimited deduction for charitable expenses 
made by benefit corporations); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise, 66 
STAN. L. REV. 387, 439 (2013) (suggesting a softening of the distinction between charitable donations 
and business expenses).  Finally, a general information letter by the IRS addressed exactly this issue and 
clarified that charitable contributions made by benefit corporations in order to generate goodwill usually 
fall under the (completely deductible) category of business expenses.  I.R.S. Gen. In. Ltr. 2016-0063 
(June 2, 2016). 
 338. While B Lab stresses on its website that the benefit corporation statutes have no tax impact, in 
light of their more ambitious goal to make all companies adopt a benefit corporation governance model, 
see supra note 34, it seems likely that they will advocate for such advantages in the future.  Some have 
reported that B Lab has already advocated for such advantages in the past.  See S. Banking & Fin. Inst. 
Comm. Hearing, supra note 45, at 8 (comments of the Nonprofit and Unincorporated Organizations 
Committee of the Business Law Section of the State Bar).  Different authors have also argued for 
favorable tax treatment of benefit corporations.  See, e.g., Thornsberry, supra note 81, at 186 (suggesting 
a tax break for benefit corporations); Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 337, at 439–41 (suggesting “tax 
benefits for hybrids as hybrids”); Minhas, Enhancing the Legal and Regulatory Environment for 
Investment in Social Enterprises, 3 MICH. J. OF PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL L. 257, 274 
(advocating for “tax incentives for hybrid/for-profit entities”).  Other authors indicated that tax 
advantages will likely be adopted in the near future.  See, e.g., Benjamin Moses Leff, The Case Against 
For-Profit Charity, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 819, 822 (2012).  I do not make a substantive judgment about 
new tax advantages for social enterprises.  See generally Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for 
For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017 (2007) (arguing that tax advantages should not be based on 
the for-profit or nonprofit form, but on the social benefit created by the entity).  But see Leff, supra note 
338, at 822 (defending the current state of the law). 
 339. This sanction already exists in New Hampshire without the repetitive element, see N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 293-C:13. V, and is part of the current version of the Alaska Bill, see HB 124, 30th Leg., 
2nd Sess. (Alaska 2017), and Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 48, suggested its adoption.  
However, caution is recommended when it comes to the interplay of this sanction and the supermajority 
requirement to convert to a regular corporation.  See Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 47–48 
(warning that the penalty of revoking the benefit corporation status (existing in Minnesota) may be used 
to avoid the supermajority requirement to convert to a regular corporation).  Murray also notes that the 
possibility of shareholders getting a fair value for their shares in the case of intentional noncompliance 
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but the severe effects on legal certainty warrant certain leniency measures.  
For instance, benefit corporations should first receive a notice alerting them 
that they have not complied with the requirement.340  This is particularly 
relevant because most benefit corporations are in a startup phase, making it 
harder to comply with corporate formalities.  For example, sixty-six of the 
106 (62%) of all non-converted Oregon benefit companies have received a 
late-annual-report notice at least once.341  
 
D. EXCEPTIONS 
 
Only mandating public reporting and actually enforcing this would 
arguably create a new problem.  It is very likely that a lot of companies that 
did not comply will change their status if they are faced with actual 
enforcement.  More importantly, some entrepreneurs may be deterred from 
forming benefit corporations in the future.  However, to create a valuable 
benefit corporation brand, there needs to be a large pool of such corporations 
that comply with the legal requirements.  Some of the reasons for 
noncompliance that were apparent from the data warrant exceptions to the 
reporting obligation. 
 
1. Startups: Comply or Explain Provision 
 
In states with low reporting rates, a high percentage of the analyzed 
companies did not convert to a benefit corporation, which suggests that many 
benefit corporations are new businesses.342  This indication has been 
confirmed by a couple of respondents who spontaneously explained that the 
reason for the absence of a report was the early stage of the launching of their 
business.343  The fact that the reporting rate in Oregon is significantly higher 
 
will probably remain theoretic due to the difficulty in proving intent.  See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.301 
subdiv. 5–7. 
 340. Compare this with the template to comply with reporting requirement in Minnesota, which 
mentions “Notice: Failure to file this form by March 31 of this year will result in the revocation of the 
corporation’s public benefit status without further notice from the Secretary of State, pursuant to 
Minnesota Statutes, Section 304A.301.”  OFF. OF THE MINN. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 149. 
 341. Seventeen of these sixty-six benefit companies were at some point effectively dissolved and 
have filed for reinstatement.  Filing for reinstatement costs $100.  How to Reinstate an Oregon 
Corporation, NORTHWEST REGISTERED AGENT, http://www.northwestregisteredagent.com/reinstate-
revive-oregon-corporation.html [https://perma.cc/3U8P-4MHY]. 
 342. Eighty-one percent in Oregon (107/133), eighty-four percent in Colorado (16/19), seventy-five 
percent in Delaware (121/161).  See Appendices II.b, III.b, and V.b.  Compare this with sixty-one percent 
in Minnesota (22/36). 
 343. See supra notes 285-86. 
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among converted companies,344 possibly suggests that startups have more 
difficulties complying with the public reporting requirement. 
The compliance-cost issue for startups requires balancing certain 
conflicting interests.  On the one hand, public reporting is crucial to holding 
benefit corporations accountable, which is of utmost importance to protect 
third-parties and to make this corporate entity viable.345  On the other hand, 
startups have limited means and a high mortality rate.346  Because of the 
difficult-to-meet supermajority requirements for conversion,347 startups will 
continue to be the main source of new benefit corporations.348  Because the 
benefit corporation brand cannot survive without adopters, the needs of 
startups must be considered.  At the same time, completely exempting them 
from reporting requirements may well erode the benefit corporation brand. 
The trick is to find the right balance between exempting startups from 
(publicly) reporting in their first few years and providing them with no 
exceptions.  One option is including an opt-out rule for newly incorporated 
benefit corporations.  For example, benefit corporations might be allowed to 
postpone reporting in the first three years after incorporation, providing that 
they explain why they are doing so.  Making benefit corporations explain in 
cases that do not comply would also discourage existing businesses planning 
to convert to benefit corporations from liquidating and reincorporating to 
escape reporting requirements.  
 
2. No exception for small companies 
 
I would not advocate for the creation of a similar opt-out exception for 
 
 344. Fifty-two percent versus six percent.  See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 345. See supra Part I.1.2. 
 346. See Office of Advocacy, supra note 201 (noting that between 2004 and 2014, on average, 78.5% 
of new businesses survived one year but also that survival rates after five years ranged from 45.4% to 
51.4% — the rate noted for a one-year interval was approximately one-third).  All twenty-eight 
surrendered, forfeited, and dissolved public benefit corporations and forty-one of the forty-three voided 
public benefit corporations in the Delaware data set were incorporated as public benefit corporations. 
 347. Most states require a two-third majority for conversion to a benefit corporation.  See, e.g., COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 7-101-504(1); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.021 subdiv. 5 and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.103 
subdiv. 2; and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §363(a).  One exception is Oregon, see OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
60.756 (requiring a simple majority except if the governing documents require a higher threshold). 
 348. B Lab seems aware of this, since it has dedicated a page of its website specifically to startups.  
See Are You a Startup, B LAB, http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/are-you-startup [https://perma.cc/6DCV-
ZMVF].  Note that different authors have argued that the majority of social enterprises (the target of 
benefit corporation statutes) are startups.  See McDonnell, supra note 126, at 25.  See also Walker, supra 
note 36, at 29 (predicting that most benefit corporations will be small socially minded startups).  See also 
Brett R. Smith et al., Social Enterprises and the Timing of Conception: Organizational Identity Tension, 
Management, and Marketing, 22 J. NONPROFIT & PUB. SECTOR MKTG. 108, 127 (2010) (finding that 
firms that are social enterprises at inception typically suffer less from identity tension). 
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small enterprises or microbusinesses.349  The most important policy 
consideration motivating this decision is that most benefit corporations are 
small and are likely to remain small.  Exempting all small benefit 
corporations from publishing benefit reports would make public reporting 
the exception instead of the rule.  These smaller corporations opted in to a 
label with a certain marketing value and certain legal protections.  The price 
they have to pay is accountability and transparency.  Not requiring older 
smaller enterprises to publish a report would weaken the brand and would 
thus give these small enterprises an advantage without requiring them to pay 
the price.350  
 
E. OTHER MEASURES TO REDUCE COSTS AND IMPROVE QUALITY 
 
States could adopt six other measures to reduce the costs of reporting 
and to increase the value of benefit reports.  The advantages of reports with 
more informational value is clear given the crucial role of reports in the 
accountability and transparency framework.351 
First, one of the reasons for low reporting rates seems to be the learning 
costs.  This factor could be addressed by a range of different measures.  
Before incorporation, it seems important to let entrepreneurs make more 
informed decisions regarding their entity choice.352  Providing a different 
document for the incorporation of benefit corporations seems like an 
important first step towards that goal.  This could be complemented by 
different educational materials, such as brochures and webpages.  That 
would also remind existing benefit corporations of their legal duties. 
Second, states could undoubtedly help benefit corporations to comply 
with reporting requirements by providing templates of benefit reports.353  
This would lower costs for the companies and probably increase compliance 
rates.  Obviously, one size does not fit all.  The template, however, would be 
optional to use and could include space for benefit corporations to customize 
it to their own needs. 
Third, states should provide a deadline for the publication of the benefit 
reports.  Both shareholders and other stakeholders should receive 
 
 349. But see Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 50 (advocating for an exception or a scaling for 
small and/or young enterprises). 
 350. See Yockey, supra note 137, at 821 (in general about nonreporting firms reaping the aura 
without real sanction for greenwashing). 
 351. See supra Section I. 
 352. See supra notes 281-82, and accompanying text. 
 353. Minnesota’s Secretary of State’s Office already provides such a template, see OFF. OF THE 
MINN. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 149.  Other states could follow this template and adapt it to their 
needs. 
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information on a timely basis.  Currently, a lot of different bills provide a 
deadline for submission to shareholders but not for publication on the 
website (or making it available to the public).354  One option would be to do 
as the Kansas legislature has very recently done, expressly stating that the 
posting should happen concurrently with the submission to shareholders.355  
If the statute requires filing of the report, it could simply provide a yearly 
deadline.356  
Fourth, no state currently has a provision allowing for consolidation of 
benefit reports for benefit corporations who are part of corporate groups.357  
Thus, these benefit corporations each have to publish their own benefit 
report, creating an additional cost potentially penalizing benefit corporations 
who want to expand.  It would be advisable to include a provision giving the 
opportunity to benefit corporations who have subsidiary benefit corporations 
to publish a consolidated benefit report, comparable to consolidated financial 
statements.358  
Finally, a measure that would enhance the value of public reporting is 
the approach of the Hawaiian benefit corporation statute — requiring the 
report to be made available for public commenting before finalizing it.359  
Including this public-comment requirement would be an effective way to 
give outside stakeholders a voice about the impact of benefit corporations.360 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Public reporting is a crucial element of current benefit corporation 
statutes.  First, it is necessary to hold benefit corporations accountable for 
their public purpose.  This is pivotal in view of the objective to create a legal 
entity that signals the reliability of the company’s social and environmental 
 
 354. See Appendix I. 
 355. New Sec. 6(e), HB 2697, 2016 Leg. Sess. (Kan. 2016). 
 356. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.301.A.1 (“before each April 1”). 
 357. See Murray, Early Report, supra note 13, at 56 (mentioning that there is no provision for 
consolidation and citing William Clark who agreed that there was no exception for subsidiaries under the 
MBCL). 
 358. My sample included different benefit corporations that were part of a group structure.  One 
Delaware public benefit corporation, People Against Dirty, PBC, has at least two subsidiaries which are 
public benefit corporations.  Patagonia Inc., a California benefit corporation, has at least three subsidiaries 
who are benefit corporations.  In Minnesota, three different public benefit corporations are part of the 
same group (Apex). 
 359. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-11(b). 
 360. Robert T. Esposito also suggests the Hawaiian statute’s approach in his article, The Social 
Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer on Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the 
United States and the Case for the Benefit Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 639, 712 (2013) 
(noting that the Hawaii approach presupposes assessment against a third-party standard). 
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responsibility claims to investors, consumers and employees.  Secondly, 
transparency itself furthers this same goal.  Because the benefits in terms of 
serving these objectives outweigh the costs, I have argued that public 
reporting has a crucial role in the benefit corporation statutes.  
Nonetheless, my empirical study of benefit reporting has shown very 
low reporting rates in Oregon, Colorado, and Delaware, ranging from eight 
percent to fourteen percent.  This lack of reporting could create a risk of 
state-sanctioned greenwashing and could endanger the sustainability of these 
new legal entities.  By analyzing some other variables, such as company size, 
company age, and third-party certification, I have identified some potential 
reasons for these low levels of reporting.  In particular, I have highlighted 
learning costs, the large amount of startups and small companies, and the 
absence of statutory enforcement as important factors. 
In Minnesota, compliance with the reporting requirement was perfect for 
the active public benefit corporations.  The main difference with Oregon, 
Colorado, and Delaware is the fact that the Minnesota statute creates a strong 
enforcement mechanism, namely, filing of the report with the secretary of 
state’s office and revocation of the public benefit corporation status upon a 
failure to do so. 
In view of these findings, I argue that policy recommendations regarding 
public reporting require a fundamental trade-off between enforcement and 
sustainability.  While perfect enforcement creates a strong brand in terms of 
quality, it may limit the quantity too much, endangering the sustainability of 
benefit corporations.  
Hence, after having recommended that all legislators mandate public 
reporting, I have sought to develop a framework of efficient enforcement, 
coupled with exceptions that seem warranted in view of the data and the 
purpose of the legislators.  I recommend mandatory filing of the report with 
the secretary of state’s office and publication of the reports by the states in a 
permanent form, ideally in a database.  Noncomplying companies can be 
sanctioned by a combination of fines, retraction of tax advantages and 
eventually administrative dissolution.  With the aforementioned trade-off in 
mind, I suggest a comply-or-explain exception for starting companies in the 
first few years after incorporation.  Finally, I have made some other 
recommendations which could limit the costs and enhance the quality of 
reporting. 
If states are not prepared to implement some of these changes to support 
the promise of increased purpose, accountability and transparency, they 
could create a short-term risk of state-sanctioned greenwashing.  In the long 
run, benefit corporations would not respond to the market needs they were 
created to address, which could render this corporate entity unsustainable. 
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Appendix I: Overview of benefit corporation statutes 
 
State In 
effect 
Frequency Third-party 
standard 
Filing with 
the secretary 
of state 
Publication on 
website 
mandated 
Deadline 
publication 
Sanction for 
non-public 
reporting 
Statute 
Model: 
Benefit Corporation 
X Annual Mandatory Yes Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Not explicit Benefit 
enforcement 
proceeding 
(BEP) 
(implicit)* 
MODEL BENEFIT 
CORP. LEGIS 
Arizona 
Benefit Corporation 
Dec. 
31, 
2014 
Annual Mandatory Yes, con- 
currently with 
SH 
Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Not explicit BEP (implicit)* ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 
10-2401 – 10-2442 
(LexisNexis 2016).  
Arkansas 
Benefit Corporation 
July 
18, 
2013 
Annual Mandatory  Yes, con-
currently with 
SH (before 
due date of 
franchise 
tax), $70 
Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Not explicit BEP (implicit)* ARK. CODE ANN. 
§§ 4-36-101 – 
401 (2016).  
California 
Benefit Corporation 
Jan. 1, 
2012 
Annual Mandatory No Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Not explicit BEP (explicit) CAL. CORP. CODE § 
14600-14631 
(Deering 2016).  
Colorado 
Public Benefit 
Corporation 
Apr. 1, 
2014 
Annual Mandatory No Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
No (not even 
for 
shareholder) 
None1 COLO. REV. STAT. 
§§ 7-101-501 – 
101-509 (2016).  
Connecticut 
Benefit Corporations 
Oct. 1, 
2014 
Annual Mandatory No Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
No BEP (explicit) CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN §§ 33-1350 – 
33-1364 (West 
2016).  
Delaware 
Public Benefit 
Corporation 
Aug. 
1, 
2013 
At least 
biennial 
Optional No Optional No None DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 
8, §§ 361-368 
(West 2016). 
 
 1. Does not create a benefit enforcement proceeding and only states conditions for derivative suits 
to enforce the obligation to balance stakeholder interests.  See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-101-501–09. 
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District of Columbia May 1, 
2013 
Annual Mandatory Yes, with 
mayor, 
biennially 
Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Not explicit BEP (implicit)* D.C. Code Ann. §§ 
29- 1301-01-1304-
01  
(West 2016).  
Florida 
Benefit Corporation 
July 1, 
2014 
Annual Mandatory No Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
No BEP (implicit)* 
No specific 
enforcement 
mechanism 
(only specific 
for 
shareholders) 
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 
607.601 – 607.613 
(LexisNexis 2016).  
Hawaii 
Sustainable 
Business 
Corporation 
July 8, 
2011 
Annual Mandatory No Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
No None2  HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 420D-1–
420D-13 
(LexisNexis 2016) .  
Illinois Benefit 
Corporation 
Jan. 1, 
2013 
Annual Mandatory No Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
No BEP (implicit)* 805 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. §§ 40/1-
40/5.01 ( West 
2016).  
Idaho 
Benefit Corporation 
July 1, 
2015 
Annual Mandatory No Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Not explicit BP(implicit)* IDAHO CODE ANN § 
30-2001-2013 
(West 2016).  
Indiana Benefit 
Corporation 
Jan 1, 
2016 
Annual Mandatory Yes, 
concurrently 
with SH, $10 
to 15 
Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Not explicit BEP (implicit)* IND. CODE ANN. § 
23-1.3-1-1 to 23-
1.3-10-6 
(LexisNexis 2016). 
Kansas Public 
Benefit Corporation 
July 1, 
2017 
Annual Mandatory No Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Not explicit None H.B. 2153 
Kentucky Public 
Benefit Corporation 
July 1, 
2017 
Annual Optional No Optional Not explicit No H.B. 35 
Louisiana 
Benefit Corporation 
Aug. 
1, 
2012 
Annual Mandatory No Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Not explicit BEP (implicit)* LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 12:1801–
12.1832 (LexisNexi 
2016).  
Massachusetts 
Benefit Corporation 
Dec. 
1, 
2012 
Annual Mandatory Yes, with 
annual 
report, $75 
Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Not explicit No right to 
hold itself out 
as benefit 
corporation 
BEP (implicit)* 
MASS. ANN. LAWS 
ch. 156E, §§ 1–16 
(LexisNexis 2016).  
Maryland Benefit 
Corporation 
Oct. 1, 
2015 
Annual Mandatory No Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Nothing 
explicit 
None3 MD. CODE ANN., 
CORPS. & AS’NS §§ 
5-6C-01 to 5-6C-08 
(LexisNexis 2016).  
Minnesota 
Public Benefit 
Corporation 
Jan. 1, 
2015 
Annual Mandatory 
for GBC 
Optional for 
SPC 
Yes, $35, 
before April 
1 
Not required, 
state has 
database 
Before  
April 1 
Revocation of 
public benefit 
corporation 
status 
MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 304A.001 – 
304A.301 (West 
2016).  
 
 2. Does not create a benefit enforcement proceeding and only states conditions for derivative and 
direct suits to enforce corporate purposes.  See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 420D(1)–(13). 
 3. Neither creates benefit enforcement proceeding, nor mentions anything about which suit and 
which conditions exist.  See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AS’NS §§ 5-6C-01–08. 
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Montana 
Benefit Corporations 
Oct. 1, 
2015 
Annual Mandatory No Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Not explicit BEP (explicit) MONT. CODE ANN. 
§§ 35-1-1401 – 35-
1-1412 (2016). 
Nebraska 
Benefit Corporation 
July 
18, 
2014 
Annual Mandatory Yes, 
concurrently 
with SH, fee 
of $25 ab 
2017 
Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Not explicit BEP (implicit)* 
 
NEB. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 21-402 – 
21-414 (West 
2016).  
New Hampshire 
Benefit Corporation 
Jan. 1, 
2015 
Annual Mandatory Yes, 
concurrently 
with SH, fee 
$35 
Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Not explicit Administrative 
dissolution by 
SoS 
BEP (implicit)* 
N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 293-C:1 – 
293-C:13 
(LexisNexis 2016).  
Nevada 
Benefit Corporation 
Jan. 1, 
2014 
Annual Mandatory No Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Not explicit BEP (explicit) NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 78B.010-
78B.190 
(LexisNexis 2016).  
New Jersey 
Benefit Corporation 
March 
1, 
2011 
Annual Mandatory Yes, 
department 
of treasury, 
together with 
SH, $70 
Yes, if the 
company has 
a website but 
there is no 
alternative 
Not explicit Department 
may forfeit 
status as 
benefit 
corporation if 
2 years of non 
filing + BEP 
(implicit) 
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 
14a:18-1 -14a:8-11 
(West 2016). 
New York 
Benefit Corporation 
Feb. 
10, 
2012 
 
Annual Mandatory Yes, 
together with 
SH, $60 
Yes, if the 
company has 
a website but 
there is no 
alternative 
Not explicit None4 N.Y. BUS. CORP. 
LAW §§ 1701–1709 
(LexisNexis 2016).  
Oregon 
Benefit Companies 
Jan. 1, 
2014 
Annual Mandatory No Choice 
between 
publishing on 
website and 
sending on 
request 
Not explicit BEP(implicit)5 OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 60.750 – 
60.770 (West 
2016).  
Pennsylvania 
Benefit Corporation 
Jan. 1, 
2013 
Annual Mandatory Yes, 
concurrently 
with SH, $70 
Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Not explicit BEP (implicit) 15 PA. STAT. AND 
CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 3301-3331 
(West 2016). 
Rhode Island Benefit 
Corporation 
Jan. 1, 
2014 
Annual Mandatory Yes, con-
currently with 
share-
holders, $106 
Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Not explicit Fine of $25 
per year if 30 
days late 
BEP (implicit) 
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 
7-5.3-1 – 7-5.3-13 
(2016).  
South Carolina 
Benefit Corporation 
June 
14, 
2012 
Annual Mandatory Yes, con-
currently with 
SH, $10 
Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Not explicit BEP(implicit) S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 
33-38-110 – 33-38-
600 (2016). 
 
 4. Neither creates benefit enforcement proceeding, nor mentions anything about which suit and 
which conditions exist.  See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1701–09. 
 5. Does not create a benefit enforcement proceeding, but Section 60.766(1) of the Oregon Revised 
Statutes has the same effect as the definition of the benefit enforcement proceeding. 
 6. Sixty dollars combined with annual report. 
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Tennessee For-
Profit Benefit 
Corporation 
Jan. 1, 
2016 
Annual Optional No Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Not explicit None7 TENN. CODE ANN. 
§§ 48-28-101 to 48-
28-109 (2016) 
Texas Public Benefit 
Corporation 
Sept. 
1, 
2017 
At least 
biennial 
Optional No Optional No None H.B. 3488 
Utah 
Benefit Corporation 
May 
13, 
2014 
Annual Mandatory Yes, when 
filing annual 
report. Fee 
unknown.  
Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Not explicit BEP (implicit) UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 16-10b-101 – 
16-10b-402 
(LexisNexis 2016).  
Vermont 
Benefit Corporation 
July 1, 
2011 
Annual Mandatory No Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Not explicit BEP(implicit) VT. STAT. ANN tit. 
11A, §§ 21.01–
21.14 (2016). 
Virginia Benefit 
Corporation 
July 1, 
2011 
Annual Mandatory No Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Not explicit BEP (implicit) VA. CODE ANN. §§ 
13.1-782 to 13.1-
791 (West 2016). 
West Virginia 
Benefit corporation 
July 1, 
2014 
Annual Mandatory No Yes, if the 
company has 
a website 
Not explicit BEP (explicit) W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 31F-1-101 to 
31F-5-501 
(LexisNexis 2016) 
 
 
Appendix II: Data Oregon 
a)Compliant benefit companies and their reports 
 
 Company name- title of report Number of 
employees 
Certification -Date of 
incorporation 
-Date of 
filing for 
benefit 
corporation 
status 
Narrative description8 
 
(A) Assess the extent 
to which the benefit 
company met or 
exceeded a third-party 
standard that the 
benefit company 
selected and identified 
in the benefit report.  
(B) Describe 
the process 
and rationale 
the benefit 
company 
used to 
select or to 
change the 
third-party 
standard 
described in 
subparagrap
h (A) of this 
paragraph. 
1 Equilibrium Capital 
Management, Inc. 
Benefit Company Report For 
2014 Year 
11-50 B 
Corporation 
- 6/30/2011 
- 12/3/2013 
 
Yes Yes 
B Impact Assessment 
No9 
2 Metropolitan Group, L.L.C. 
2015 Annual Report 
11-50 B 
Corporation 
- before 
1/1/200110 
- 12/24/2013 
Yes Yes 
B Impact Assessment 
No 
3 Neil Kelly Co., Inc 
2015 B Corp Narrative 
201-500 B 
Corporation 
- 6/22/1964 
- 12/24/2013 
Yes No 
But Certified B 
Corporation 
No 
4 Green Girl Land Development 
Solutions LLC 
1-10 No - 12/26/2013 
- 12/26/2013 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
 7. Does not create a benefit enforcement proceeding and only states conditions for derivative suits 
to enforce balancing of stakeholder interests.  See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-28-101–09. 
 8. See Section 60.768(2)(a) of the Oregon Revised Statutes for the prescriptions regarding this 
narrative description. 
 9. Explains the meaning of the standard but not the rationale or the process behind the choice. 
 10. Precise incorporation date not available on secretary-of-state office’s website. 
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Green Girl Land Development 
Solutions LLC 2015 Benefit 
Report 
 B Impact 
Assessment11 
5 BestHq LLC 
2015 Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Benefit 
Report 
1-10 Green 
America 
-12/31/2013 
-12/31/2013 
 
Yes Yes 
Green America 
Yes 
6 
 
 
Palace Industries, Inc. 
Section on website titled ‘B 
Company’  
11-50 B 
Corporation 
-3/04/2002 
-12/31/2013 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
But Certified B 
Corporation 
No 
 
 
7 Canvas Dreams, LLC 
Sustainability Metrics12 
1-10 B 
Corporation 
-04/08/2005 
-1/2/2014 
Yes No13 
But Certified B 
Corporation 
Yes 
8 Gladrags Sustainable 
Women’s Health, LLC 
Annual Benefit Report 2015 
1-10 B 
Corporation 
-02/22/2011 
-1/2/2014 
 
Yes Yes 
B Lab Impact 
Assessment 
No 
9 Freeroot Ventures Inc. 
2015 Benefit Company Report 
11-50 B 
Corporation 
-2/18/2010 
-1/2/2014 
Yes Yes 
B Lab Impact 
Assessment 
Yes 
10 Immix Law Group PC 
Immix Law Annual B Corp 
Report -2016 
11-50 B 
Corporation 
-3/22/2011 
-1/2/2014 
Yes No 
But Certified B 
Corporation 
No 
11 Ingenuity Innovation Center, 
LLC 
2015 Transparency Benefit 
Report 
1-10 No -11/13/2012 
-1/2/2014 
 
Yes Yes 
B Lab Impact 
Assessment 
No 
12 Beau Delicious! International, 
LLC 
Oregon’s First Benefit 
Company 2015 Report 
51-200 B 
Corporation 
 
-8/16/2005 
-1/6/2014 
 
Yes No No 
13 Celilo Group Media, Inc. 
Benefit Company Report 2015 
11-50 B 
Corporation 
-06/05/2003 
-1/17/2014 
 
Yes No14 
Use own formula15 
But Certified B 
Corporation 
No 
14 Henkels Law LLC 
Annual Benefit Company 
Report 2015-2016 
Unknown No -04/03/2014 
-04/03/2014 
Yes Yes 
B Impact 
Assessment16 
Yes 
15 Enso LLC 
2015 Year End Benefit Report 
Unknown No -02/03/2014 
-06/19/2014 
Yes No No 
16 Tony’s Chocolonely, Inc 
Tony’s Chocolonely annual 
fair report 2014/2015 
11-50 B 
Corporation  
-07/17/2014 
-07/17/2014 
Yes Global Reporting 
Initiative 
 
 
 11. Literally calls B Lab the standard but shows a score on the B Impact Assessment. 
 12. The CEO of this company referred to the webpage as being their 2015 benefit report. 
 13. Note that this corporation is also a B Corporation and could have included the B Impact 
Assessment. 
 14. Note that this corporation is also a B Corporation and could have included the B Impact 
Assessment.  
 15. Total coupon redemptions x average transaction size. 
 16. The company also used the Oregon State Bar Sustainable Future Section, Partners in 
Sustainability, as a secondary standard but could not use it as a primary standard because the Managing 
Member of the firm served on the executive board of the Sustainable Futures Section.  See OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 60.750(6)(b) 
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17 Hopworks Urban Brewery 
LLC 
HUB Sustainability Report: 
2014 
51-200 B 
Corporation 
-6/9/2006 
-7/18-2014 
Yes No 
But Certified B 
Corporation 
No 
18 Fair Flies, LLC 
Annual Benefit Corp 
Statement 
1-10 No -11/12/2014 
-11/12/2014 
 B Impact 
Assessment*17 
No 
19 Catalyst Law, LLC 
Annual Benefit Report 
1-10 No -11/17/2014 
-11/17/2014 
Yes No No 
 
 
b)Data Oregon 
−Benefit Reports 
 
 Complied on their website 
Complied by sending on 
request Non-responsive Responded no Total 
Total number 14 5 103 11 133 
INC 4 2 17 1 24.00 
LLC 10 2 86 9 107 
PC 0 1 0 0 1 
LTD 0 0 0 1 1 
 
−Principal place of business 
 OR WA ID CA Total 
Number 129 1 1 2 133 
 
−Website 
 
 Websites No websites Total 
Number 57 76 133 
Number with benefit reports 19 0 19 
Compliance rate 33.33% 0% 14% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17. Fair Flies, LLC, stated that they used the B Corp Handbook (Ryan Honeyman) as a guide and 
independent third-party standard.  This book does not provide such a standard but does explain the B 
Impact Assessment.  Thus, Fair Flies relied on an indirect source in explaining a valid third-party 
standard. 
2_VERHEYDEN_APPENDIX.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2018  12:18 PM 
2018 PUBLIC REPORTING BY BENEFIT CORPORATIONS 103 
 
 
 
Appendix III Data Colorado 
a)Complying Colorado public benefit corporations and their reports 
 
Company name- title 
of report 
Number of 
employees 
Certification -Date of 
incorporation 
-Date of filing 
for benefit 
corporation 
status 
The ways in which 
the public benefit 
corporation 
promoted the 
public benefit 
identified in the 
articles of 
incorporation and 
the best interests 
of those materially 
affected by the 
corporation's 
conduct; 
Any 
circumstances 
that have 
hindered the 
public benefit 
corporation’s 
promotion of the 
identified public 
benefit and the 
best interests of 
those materially 
affected by the 
corporation’s 
conduct 
The process and 
rational for 
selecting or 
changing the 
third-party 
standard used to 
prepare the 
benefit report 
An assessment of the 
overall social and 
environmental 
performance of the 
public benefit 
corporation against a 
third-party standard 
Vention Resources, 
Inc., PBC 
PBC Annual Report 
 
1-10 No -7/8/2014 
-7/8/2014 
Yes Yes No No 
Jason Wiener, P.C., 
a Public Benefit 
Corporation 
2015 Public Benefit 
Report 
1-10 B 
Corporation 
-1/12/2014 
-8/10/2014 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
b)Data Colorado 
−Benefit Reports 
 
 Complied on website 
Complied by 
sending on request No report on website Non responsive Total 
Number 1 1 7 10 19 
Percentage 5% 5% 37% 53%  
 
 
−Principal place of business 
 
 CO TX Total 
Number 18 1 19 
 
 
−Website 
 
Website Websites No websites Total 
Number 10 9 17 
Number with benefit reports 1 1  
Compliance rate 10% 11.11%  
 
 
Appendix IV Data Minnesota 
−Benefit Reports 
 
 Reports available online 
Number 36 
Compliant 36 
Compliance percentage 100% 
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−Principal place of business 
 
 Minnesota Iowa 
Number 35 1 
 
−Website 
 
 Websites No websites Total 
Number 27 9 36 
% with website 75% 25%  
 
 
Appendix V Data Delaware 
a)Voluntary reporting public benefit corporations and their reports 
 
 Company name- 
title of report 
Number 
of 
employ-
ees 
Certification -Date of 
incorporation 
-Date of filing 
for benefit 
corporation 
status 
(1) The 
objectives the 
board of 
directors has 
established to 
promote such 
public benefit or 
public benefits 
and interests; 
(2) The standards 
the board of 
directors has 
adopted to 
measure the 
corporation's 
progress in 
promoting such 
public benefit or 
public benefits and 
interests 
(3) Objective factual 
information based 
on those standards 
regarding the 
corporation's 
success in meeting 
the objectives for 
promoting such 
public benefit or 
public benefits and 
interests 
(4) An assessment of 
the corporation's 
success in meeting 
the objectives and 
promoting such public 
benefit or public 
benefits and interests 
1 Alter Eco 
Americas PBC 
2015 Full Circle 
Sustainability 
Impact Report 
11-50 B 
Corporation 
Green 
America 
- 4/19/2004 
- 8/1/2013 
 
Yes Yes 
B Impact 
Assessment 
Yes Yes 
2 Exemplar 
Companies, PBC 
2013-2014 
Exemplar’s First 
Annual Benefit 
Report 
11-50 No - 4/13/2007 
- 8/1/2013 
 
Yes Yes 
B Impact 
Assessment 
Own Key 
Performance 
Indicators18 
Yes Yes 
3 Grassroots 
Capital 
Management 
Corp., PBC19 
Annual Benefit 
Report 2015 
1-10 B 
Corporation 
- 10/5/2007 
- 8/1/2013 
 
 
Yes Yes 
B Impact 
Assessment 
Yes Yes 
4 Plum PBC 
Mission report 
2015 
51-200 B 
Corporation 
-12/18/’08 
-8/1/2013 
 
Yes Yes 
B Impact 
Assessment 
Yes Yes 
5 
 
 
Raven + Lily PBC 
Community Give 
Back Impact For 
2016 
1-10 B 
Corporation 
-8/1/2013 
-8/1/2013 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
But Certified B 
Corporation 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
6 Handup PBC 
Our Impact in 
2016 
1-10 No -8/21/2013 
-8/21/2013 
Yes No No Yes 
 
 18. Also used their own ‘Key Performance Indicators,’ because they are disappointed with the way 
B Lab evaluates their impact.  They don’t feel like their improvements are visible. 
 19. Expressly targeted at stakeholders. 
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7 Global Uprising, 
PBC 
Benefit 
Corporation 
Report 
11-50 B 
Corporation 
-10/2/2013 
-10/2/2013 
 
 
Yes No20 
But Certified B 
Corporation 
Yes Yes 
8 Rescue Social 
Change Group, 
PBC 
Benefit 
Corporation 
Report 2016 
51-200 B 
Corporation 
-7/14/2014 
-7/14/2014 
 
Yes Yes 
B Lab Impact 
Assessment 
Yes Yes 
9 Potluck Energy, 
PBC. 
Benefit 
Corporation21 
2014 Annual 
Report 
1-10 No -8/12/2014 
-8/12/2014 
 
Yes No Yes Yes 
1
0 
Altschool, PBC 
2016 Benefit 
Corporation 
Report 
51-200 B 
Corporation 
 
-12/27/2011 
-10/8/2014 
 
Yes Yes 
B Lab Impact 
Assessment 
Yes Yes 
1
1 
EA Engineering, 
Science, and 
Technology, Inc. 
PBC 
2014-2015 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Report and Public 
Benefit 
Corporation 
Statement 
201-500 No -9/11/1986 
-12/12/’14 
 
Yes Yes, 
Global Reporting 
Initiative 
Yes Yes 
1
2 
Beanfields, PBC 
Beanfields 2015 
BPC Statement 
11-50 B 
Corporation 
Green 
America 
-12/19/14 
-12/19/14 
 
No No22 
But Certified B 
Corporation 
Yes No 
1
3 
Maps Public 
Benefit 
Corporation 
Biennial Special 
Purpose 
Review23 
11-50 No -12/19/14 
-12/19/14 
 
Yes No Yes Yes 
b)Data Delaware 
−Benefit Reports 
 
 
Complied on 
their website 
Complied by 
sending on request 
Responded 
without sending Non-responsive Total 
Number 12 1 43 105 161 
% with benefit reports 7% 1% 27% 65%  
 
 
 20. Note that this corporation is also a B Corporation and could have included the B Impact 
Assessment.  
 21. Using Benefit Corporation interchangeably with Public Benefit Corporation. 
 22. Note that this corporation is also a B Corporation and could have included the B Impact 
Assessment. 
 23. This review is a note in the Consolidated Financial Statements of the 100% shareholder of the 
PBC, a nonprofit. 
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−Principal place of business 
 
 
 
 
-Website 
 
 Websites No websites Total 
Number 114 47 161 
Number with reports 13 0  
Reporting rate 11.40%   
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